Massive expansion of Russian pipeline capacity, including the Power of Siberia 2, will increase gas flows to China from 38 BCM in 2025 to 106 BCM by 2035. This dramatic increase in secure overland supply is the primary reason why China's demand for seaborne LNG is forecast to peak and then plateau around 2032.
Even as a massive LNG supply glut promises lower prices, emerging Asian markets lack the physical capacity to absorb it. A severe shortage of regasification terminals, storage, and gas-fired power plants creates a hard ceiling on demand growth, meaning cheap gas alone is not enough to clear the market.
With over half of new global LNG supply coming from the US, an impending oversupply will force US export facilities to operate at significantly lower utilization rates. This transforms the US from a simple high-growth exporter into a flexible, market-balancing swing producer, a role it was not designed for.
As its import needs peak, China is positioned to transition from a simple demand center to a sophisticated global LNG trader. Its vast storage capacity, extensive regasification infrastructure, and diverse contract portfolio will provide the flexibility and optionality to resell cargoes and influence global energy flows.
Contrary to common assumptions, China's future natural gas demand growth will be led by the industrial sector, not power generation. Policy support for manufacturing and lower global LNG prices are expected to drive significant coal-to-gas switching in industrial processes, while gas in the power sector remains a secondary source to balance renewables.
Contrary to expectations, surging power demand from data centers and semiconductor manufacturing in Japan and South Korea is not boosting LNG imports. Instead, national policies are prioritizing renewables and nuclear to meet this new demand, effectively capping growth for natural gas in these key established markets.
Beyond the well-known semiconductor race, the AI competition is shifting to energy. China's massive, cheaper electricity production is a significant, often overlooked strategic advantage. This redefines the AI landscape, suggesting that superiority in atoms (energy) may become as crucial as superiority in bytes (algorithms and chips).
Based on its energy (BTU) equivalent, the price of natural gas has historically been about one-sixth the price of a barrel of oil. Currently, it trades at a much steeper discount (around 1/20th), making it arguably the most undervalued commodity in the last 50 years.
While semiconductor access is a critical choke point, the long-term constraint on U.S. AI dominance is energy. Building massive data centers requires vast, stable power, but the U.S. faces supply chain issues for energy hardware and lacks a unified grid. China, in contrast, is strategically building out its energy infrastructure to support its AI ambitions.
The rise of destination-flexible U.S. LNG is fundamentally altering global gas markets. By acting as the marginal supplier and an effective 'global storage hub,' the U.S. reduces Europe's strategic need for high storage levels, leading to structurally lower prices and a new market equilibrium.
China's forthcoming economic plan is expected to introduce more stringent environmental rules, potentially moving from GDP intensity-based targets (emissions per unit of GDP) to an absolute cap on total emissions. This policy change would directly limit the consumption of all fossil fuels, including natural gas.