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Tom says Russia treats citizens as cells in one body and does not care about individual deaths. He points to Stalingrad, where Drew says 1.2 million to 2 million died in a small area. Russia will keep throwing people at the problem, so casualty pressure may not force it to stop.
Russia perceives itself as having momentum and believes its military position will strengthen in the coming months. This confidence removes any urgency to negotiate or make significant concessions, making it the most significant impediment to ending the conflict.
Russia is employing a three-pronged strategy against Kyiv: escalating kinetic attacks on civilian targets like supermarkets, sabotage including assassinations, and intensified disinformation campaigns. This aims to make the city unlivable and spark a mass exodus before winter even begins.
Against an enemy employing asymmetric warfare, achieving total victory may be impossible without resorting to indiscriminate killing and infrastructure destruction. Since modern Western societies lack the moral appetite for such tactics, decisive military wins become elusive.
The perception that democracies have a 'glass jaw' is flawed. A population's willingness to absorb casualties isn't about the political system but the stakes. Citizens will make immense sacrifices for national survival (like Ukraine) but not for poorly-justified conflicts without a clear, existential threat.
Ukraine's most realistic theory of success is not reclaiming all territory militarily, but leveraging its advantages to stabilize the front and inflict unsustainable casualties and economic costs on Russia. This strategy aims to make the war so futile for Moscow that it forces a favorable negotiated settlement.
Russia's ability to sustain its war effort is severely constrained by its training infrastructure. It is currently losing 35,000 soldiers per month, while its maximum training capacity is estimated at 50,000. This narrow margin suggests a looming, unsustainable attrition rate for Russian forces.
Russia initially conducted its invasion as a detached 'consumer war,' where citizens experienced victories through media without direct disruption to daily civilian life. However, Snyder argues that Ukrainian long-range strikes and casualty deficits are forcing mandatory mobilization over paid contract soldiers. Drafting ordinary citizens fundamentally changes family and social dynamics, making it politically risky for Putin to sustain the war past spring.
Despite perceived advantages, Russia's military performance in 2025 was poor. It achieved only incremental gains at the cost of soaring casualties, pushing their manpower losses beyond recruitment rates. This trend suggests that time is increasingly working against Moscow's ability to sustain offensive operations.
The idea that Ukraine must accept a peace deal because the war is "unwinnable" is a flawed narrative that mirrors Russian propaganda. This perspective overlooks Russia's massive daily casualties and straining wartime economy. The war is unsustainable, but arguably more so for Russia than for Ukraine.
With the goal of retaking all territory now unrealistic, Ukraine's military command has adopted a new strategy: inflict such high monthly casualties on Russian forces (40-50k) that Putin cannot sustain recruitment levels, ultimately forcing him to seek a ceasefire due to domestic pressure.