A huge Series A before clear product-market fit creates immense pressure to scale prematurely. This can force 'unnatural acts' and unrealistic expectations, potentially leading the company to implode. It challenges the 'more money is always better' mindset at the early stages.
At its Series A, ServiceUp had "concept-market fit"—the core idea was compelling enough to attract investors and early customers—but not yet product-market fit. The product didn't fully solve the problem, but the vision was strong enough to secure the capital needed to continue building towards it.
Many businesses reach a million in revenue through sheer effort but then stall. The shift to scaling requires achieving product-market fit, which creates leverage and pulls in customers, leading to exponential profitability instead of diminishing returns from just pushing harder.
Raising too much money at a high valuation puts a "bogey on your back." It forces a "shoot the moon" strategy, which can decrease capital efficiency, make future fundraising harder, and limit potential exit opportunities by making the company too expensive for acquirers.
The most dangerous venture stage is the "breakout" middle ground ($500M-$2B valuations). This segment is flooded with capital, leading firms to write large checks into companies that may not have durable product-market fit. This creates a high risk of capital loss, as companies are capitalized as if they are already proven winners.
Investors like Stacy Brown-Philpot and Aileen Lee now expect founders to demonstrate a clear, rapid path to massive scale early on. The old assumption that the next funding round would solve for scalability is gone; proof is required upfront.
Even a company with significant revenue can be stuck in the "problem-market fit" stage if it introduces too much complexity. Pursuing multiple products, ICPs, or go-to-market motions dilutes focus and exponentially increases difficulty, hindering the ability to scale effectively.
Venture rounds are compressing and conflating, with massive "seed" rounds of $30M+ essentially combining a seed and Series A. This sets a dangerous trap: the expectations for your next funding round will be equivalent to those of a traditional Series B company, dramatically raising the bar for growth.
Rapidly scaling companies can have fantastic unit economics but face constant insolvency risk. The cash required for advance hiring and inventory means you're perpetually on the edge of collapse, even while growing revenue by triple digits. You are going out of business every day.
The founder advises against always pursuing the highest valuation, noting it can lead to immense pressure and difficulties in subsequent rounds if the market normalizes. Prioritizing investor chemistry and a fair, responsible valuation is a more sustainable long-term strategy.
Founders mistakenly believe large funding rounds create market pull. Instead, raise minimally to survive until you find a 'wave' or 'dam.' Once demand is so strong you can't keep up with demo requests, then raise a large round to scale operations and capture the opportunity.