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Under Secretary of War Emil Michael reveals a strategic pivot away from restrictive, "fair fight" rules of engagement. The new approach, reminiscent of the Powell Doctrine, emphasizes using overwhelming force to achieve clear objectives quickly and minimize US casualties.
Under Trump, the primary tool for projecting U.S. power is shifting from economic instruments like tariffs to direct military, intelligence, and cyber capabilities. This "Donroe Doctrine" leverages America's asymmetrical advantages in these areas, especially in its hemisphere, to achieve foreign policy wins without relying on economic coercion.
The US military action against Iran lacks a clear off-ramp or stated goal, violating the Powell Doctrine. This ambiguity between objectives like "regime change" and other aims creates strategic confusion and risks prolonged engagement without a defined victory condition.
Official White House and Department of War documents outline a "burden sharing" doctrine. This policy dictates that when the U.S. acts in its own interest, allies must bear the consequential burdens, including military casualties and economic fallout. Israel is explicitly named as the model for this approach.
Unlike nations that have historically endured massive losses, the United States has a low willingness to suffer casualties, which is a strategic vulnerability. Adversaries understand that American political will for a prolonged conflict is fragile and can be broken by simply waiting out the initial shock and absorbing blows.
Despite advancements in AI, cyber, and air power, the fundamental nature of warfare remains unchanged. To defend, protect, and secure territory for civilization, a physical presence is non-negotiable. You cannot achieve enduring effects from a distance; you must put "young men in the dirt."
Defining success as an ambitious, all-or-nothing outcome like 'regime change' is a critical mistake. Instead, administrations should set clear, measurable military objectives, such as degrading missile capabilities or naval threats. This allows them to define success, declare victory, and create a clear off-ramp for military campaigns.
The US is moving from a global deterrence posture to concentrating massive force for specific operations, as seen with Iran. This strategy denudes other theaters of critical assets, creating windows of opportunity for adversaries like China while allies are left exposed.
Unlike 20th-century bombing campaigns, modern precision-strike capabilities allow for targeting a country's entire leadership from a distance. This strategy, lacking a plan for subsequent governance, represents a largely untested and rare event in military history.
Despite China's rapid military buildup, the US maintains a critical advantage: decades of real-world combat experience. Under Secretary of War Emil Michael notes that US generals have learned hard lessons from the Global War on Terror, while their Chinese counterparts lack recent conflict experience.
The US military's 30-year strategy, born from the Gulf War, of relying on small numbers of technologically superior weapons is flawed. The war in Ukraine demonstrates that protracted, industrial-scale conflicts are won by mass and production volume, not just technological sophistication.