The CHIPS program office developed an internal "4Cs" framework to systematically evaluate funding applications. This model assessed projects based on manufacturing volume (Capacity), technological know-how (Capability), market dynamics (Competition), and importance to end-use markets (Criticality), ensuring consistent and fair decision-making.

A critical asymmetry exists in the US-China competition: It is far harder for the U.S. to rebuild its complex manufacturing ecosystems and tacit process knowledge than it is for China to improve its scientific research capabilities, where it is already making significant strides.

It's a common error to conflate the CHIPS Act and the October 2022 chip controls. The CHIPS Act was a legislative effort for domestic manufacturing resilience. The executive export controls were a separate national security policy focused on denying China access to high-end compute for military applications.

The current trade friction is part of a larger, long-term bipartisan U.S. strategy of "competitive confrontation." This involves not just tariffs but also significant domestic investment, like the CHIPS Act, to build resilient supply chains and reduce reliance on China for critical industries, a trend expected to persist across administrations.

Arm's CEO argues the US has lost its 'muscle memory' for 24/7 manufacturing. The core issue is cultural: manufacturing isn't seen as a prestigious career, unlike in Taiwan where working for TSMC is highly esteemed. This cultural gap is a major hurdle for onshoring efforts.

The CHIPS Act deliberately de-emphasized funding for critical materials. This was a pragmatic choice driven by tax law: material processing projects don't qualify for the 25% investment tax credit that fabs get. Covering this gap with direct grants would have been too costly for the program's limited budget.

A small team in the Biden White House successfully implemented crucial export controls on semiconductor technology before ChatGPT's release made AI a mainstream obsession, allowing them to act proactively rather than reactively.

While the fabless semiconductor model is blamed for the U.S. losing manufacturing, it was a crucial enabler for innovation. It allowed design-focused companies like Apple, NVIDIA, and Qualcomm to de-risk manufacturing and focus on creating new technologies, highlighting a key tradeoff between industrial base and innovation velocity.

Major US technology policies, such as the October 2022 semiconductor export controls, are not sudden shocks. They are often telegraphed years in advance through influential government commission reports, like the one from the National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence (NSCAI), which provided the blueprint for these actions.