The term 'private equity' replaced 'leveraged buyout' (LBO) after the LBO boom of the 1980s ended in a wave of high-profile bankruptcies. Howard Marks notes this name change was a deliberate marketing move to shed negative connotations and attract fresh capital to a reinvented industry.
Capital has become commoditized with thousands of PE firms competing. The old model of buying low and selling high with minor tweaks no longer works. True value creation has shifted to hands-on operational improvements that drive long-term growth, a skill many investors lack.
Historically, private equity was pursued for its potential outperformance (alpha). Today, with shrinking public markets, its main value is providing diversification and access to a growing universe of private companies that are no longer available on public exchanges. This makes it a core portfolio completion tool.
The term 'private equity' is now insufficient. The M&A market's capital base has expanded to include sovereign wealth funds and large, tech-generated family offices that invest directly or co-invest like traditional PE firms. This diversification creates a larger, more resilient pool of capital for deals.
The private equity market is following the hedge fund industry's maturation curve. Just as hedge funds saw a consolidation around large platforms and niche specialists, a "shakeout" is coming for undifferentiated, mid-market private equity firms that lack a unique edge or sufficient scale.
When private equity firms begin marketing to retail investors, it's less about sharing wealth and more a sign of distress. This pivot often occurs when institutional backers demand returns and raising new capital becomes difficult, forcing firms to tap the public for liquidity.
The private equity market has abundant capital and willing companies, yet transactions are stalled. This is because General Partners (GPs) fear selling at low returns and Limited Partners (LPs) fear over-commitment due to liquidity concerns, creating a gridlock where no one wants to act.
Contrary to fears of a frothy market, current M&A and LBO activity is more conservative than the 2007 era. A key difference is that today's deals involve a substantially higher amount of equity contribution from buyers, making them structurally less risky than those seen before the financial crisis.
Unlike venture-backed startups that chase lightning in a bottle (often ending in zero), private equity offers a different path. Operators can buy established, cash-flowing businesses and apply their growth skills in a less risky environment with shorter time horizons and a higher probability of a positive financial outcome.
Howard Marks highlights a critical issue in private equity: a massive overhang of portfolio companies needing to be sold to return capital. Higher interest rates have made exits difficult, creating a liquidity bottleneck that slows distributions to LPs and commitments to new funds.
Jeff Aronson reframes "distressed-for-control" as a private equity strategy, not a credit one. While a traditional LBO uses leverage to acquire a company, a distressed-for-control transaction achieves the same end—ownership—by deleveraging the company through a debt-to-equity conversion. The mechanism differs, but the outcome is identical.