Despite different political systems, the US and Chinese internets have converged because power is highly centralized. Whether it's a government controlling platforms like Weibo or tech oligarchs like Elon Musk controlling X, the result is a small group dictating the digital public square's rules.

The same general-purpose technologies, like social media or AI, function as a wedge. They create massive productivity gains and wealth for a minority who leverage them effectively, while simultaneously distracting and disadvantaging the majority who passively consume them.

A strange dynamic exists where the tech leaders building AI are also the loudest voices warning of its potential to destroy humanity. This dual narrative of immense promise and existential threat serves to centralize their power, positioning them as the only ones who can both create and control this technology.

The argument that AI will reduce inequality is flawed because democratizing access to tools doesn't democratize the economics. Technology markets naturally consolidate power and wealth, as seen with search engines and social networks. The financial benefits of AI are likely to concentrate at the top.

New communication technologies historically democratize society before elites regain control. Jill Lepore argues that emerging AI technologies are breaking this cycle, as they appear to be consolidating power with elites from the outset rather than providing an initial wave of popular empowerment.

The Catholic Church banned Gutenberg's printing press for over 100 years, fearing the loss of control that widespread literacy would bring. Gutenberg himself died without seeing its impact. This historical precedent shows that powerful institutions have always resisted technologies that democratize information and power.

The primary cleavage in both Chinese and US online society is not political but based on wealth and agency. A deep pessimism exists among everyday users, who feel like "non-player characters" (NPCs) used by technology, contrasting sharply with the optimism of the tech elites building these systems.

New technologies debut with a glimpse of a beautiful, 'possible' future (e.g., social media connecting activists). Aza Raskin argues this phase is fleeting. Market incentives inevitably capture the tech, steering it toward its 'probable,' often more harmful, future driven by engagement and profit.

Fears of AI power consolidating among a few giants like Google and Nvidia mirror past concerns about companies like Cisco controlling the internet. History shows that all transformative technologies eventually commoditize and diffuse, moving from centralized control to broad, democratized access at the edge.