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Stock exchanges race against one another to attract new corporate listings by relaxing governance rules and permitting unequal voting shares. Consequently, long-term asset owners lose their power to replace permanent board members, influence corporate direction, and hold leadership accountable.

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Upcoming mega-IPOs from companies like OpenAI and SpaceX will likely feature dual-class share structures. This mechanism grants certain insiders, typically founders, shares with outsized voting power (e.g., 10 votes per share). This allows them to retain control over the company's strategic direction even after diluting their economic ownership by going public.

The structure of public company boards often fails to align with shareholder interests. Directors are highly compensated regardless of performance and often lack significant personal investment, creating a culture of complacency where they act as a rubber stamp for management rather than a check on power.

As passive index funds dominate markets, they become massive but indifferent shareholders. Unlike fundamental investors, they vote proxies based on institutional safety ("CYA") or political agendas, not on what maximizes a specific company's value, which fundamentally warps corporate governance.

Reflecting on his public company experience, Zayo's CEO advises creating super-voting shares for insiders during an IPO. This concentrates control and makes the company a much less appealing target for activist investors who can't easily gain influence.

For companies like SpaceX, Nasdaq now allows index inclusion in just 15 days (down from six months) and artificially inflates weight by treating a 5% float as 15%. This creates a massive, predictable, and forced buying event from index funds, which must sell other holdings to accommodate the new stock, distorting the market.

Venture capitalist Bruce Booth explains that bankers, lawyers, audit firms, and VCs all have strong financial incentives for a company to go public. This creates systemic pressure that may not align with the company's best long-term interests.

Competition from states like Nevada and Texas, which market themselves as having higher barriers to shareholder lawsuits, is forcing Delaware's hand. To avoid losing its corporate charter business, Delaware has also weakened its own laws, contributing to an overall erosion of shareholder rights across jurisdictions.

Beyond high compliance costs, companies are deterred from going public by the constant threat of "vexatious" class-action lawsuits following any stock dip and the weaponization of shareholder proposals, which makes managing annual general meetings a significant burden. These factors discourage the transition to public markets.

Passive funds from firms like Vanguard and Blackrock outsource their proxy voting to advisors like ISS. These advisors advocate for shareholder primacy in ways that are often inversely correlated with long-term value creation, distorting corporate governance at a massive scale.

Our current system of corporate governance is politically absurd. It's akin to letting tourists who are in town for one day vote in a national election. This structure, which empowers transient owners, inherently favors short-term exploitation over long-term stability and value creation.