Xi Jinping's focus on a long arc of Chinese history and managing a near abroad from a position of strength connects him more to powerful Qing emperors like Kangxi and Qianlong than to the revolutionary Mao. This comparison highlights his goal of restoring China's historical predominance.

Observing the USSR's fall, the Chinese Communist Party drew key lessons to ensure its survival: use overwhelming force against dissent, prioritize the Party's power monopoly even at the cost of economic efficiency, and aggressively assimilate ethnic minorities to prevent separatism.

The CCP's durability stems from studying and combining disparate models: the Catholic Church's hierarchical doctrine, the Sicilian Mafia's code of silence (omerta), and a rigorous analysis of the Soviet Union's collapse to ensure its own survival.

This framework contrasts China's top-down, control-oriented approach (e.g., one-child policy, zero-COVID) with the American focus on individual rights and legal process, explaining their divergent development paths and societal structures.

China's immense state capacity allows for rapid infrastructure development but also enables disastrous national policies like the one-child policy or Zero-COVID. Unlike the deliberative U.S. system, China's efficiency means that when it goes off track, it can go catastrophically off track before any course correction is possible.

While designed to reward merit, China's Gaokao system favors the wealthy. Families in elite districts or those who can afford expensive private tutoring have a significant advantage, perpetuating inequality rather than providing a level playing field for all students.

The U.S. has a historical engineering tradition it can revive to solve its building crisis. China, however, lacks a deep-rooted liberal or lawyerly tradition of constraining state power. This path dependency makes it far easier for America to become a better builder than for China to become more rights-respecting.

China's "engineering state" mindset extends beyond physical projects to social engineering. The Communist Party treats its own people as a resource to be moved or molded—whether displacing a million for a dam or enforcing the one-child policy—viewing society as just another material to achieve its objectives.

Unlike pragmatic predecessors, Xi Jinping operates from a quasi-religious belief that China is divinely intended to be the "middle kingdom"—the world's dominant power. This ideological North Star explains his confrontational approach to geopolitics, even when it seems economically irrational.