Xi Jinping's focus on a long arc of Chinese history and managing a near abroad from a position of strength connects him more to powerful Qing emperors like Kangxi and Qianlong than to the revolutionary Mao. This comparison highlights his goal of restoring China's historical predominance.
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Observing the USSR's fall, the Chinese Communist Party drew key lessons to ensure its survival: use overwhelming force against dissent, prioritize the Party's power monopoly even at the cost of economic efficiency, and aggressively assimilate ethnic minorities to prevent separatism.
China's primary strategic goal is to be the leading power in East Asia and the Western Pacific. While it lacks a current plan for global domination, its appetite could grow with success, and controlling this economically vital region provides a de facto form of global preeminence.
While Xi looms large, his foreign policy is largely consistent with the path set by his predecessors. He has capitalized on China's increased power to pursue established goals more intensely, but he has not radically changed the overall direction. Focusing only on him as an individual misses this continuity.
The dynamic between a rising power (China) and a ruling one (the U.S.) fits the historical pattern of the "Thucydides' trap." In 12 of the last 16 instances of this scenario, the confrontation has ended in open war, suggesting that a peaceful resolution is the exception, not the rule.
Unlike the US's focus on quarterly results and election cycles, China's leadership operates on a civilizational timescale. From their perspective, the US is a recent phenomenon, and losing the US market is an acceptable short-term cost in a much longer game of survival and dominance. This fundamental difference in strategic thinking is often missed.
China's showcase of advanced military hardware, like its new aircraft carrier, is primarily a psychological tool. The strategy is to build a military so 'forbiddingly huge' that the US would hesitate to engage, allowing China to achieve goals like reabsorbing Taiwan without fighting. This suggests their focus is on perceived power to deter intervention.
Unlike the Soviet Union's missionary zeal to spread communism, China does not want other nations to become Chinese. Its worldview is centered on being the 'Middle Kingdom'—the sun which others orbit. It desires respect and a preeminent position, not to export its political system.
China's inner circle, led by Xi Jinping, believes the U.S. is in terminal decline. They view American social and political paradoxes—like New York, the center of capitalism, electing a socialist—not as features of a complex democracy, but as evidence of a fracturing and decaying society.
Unlike pragmatic predecessors, Xi Jinping operates from a quasi-religious belief that China is divinely intended to be the "middle kingdom"—the world's dominant power. This ideological North Star explains his confrontational approach to geopolitics, even when it seems economically irrational.
Viewing China as a "rising" power is incorrect; it's a "reascending" one. For 70% of the years since 1500, China had the world's largest GDP. Its current trajectory is a return to its historical dominance, a framing that fundamentally alters the understanding of its global ambitions.
