While the real estate crisis was the initial trigger, the root cause of weak household consumption is now the precarious labor market. With nearly a third of urban workers in insecure "gig" roles, fear about job security is a bigger constraint on spending.
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Anecdotal evidence suggests even affluent consumers are pulling back on spending, despite a strong stock market. This may be driven by concerns over the weakening job market, as even well-to-do parents worry about their adult children's employment prospects, creating caution across the family unit.
Despite accumulating massive deposits (100 trillion RMB), Chinese households are reluctant to spend. This is driven by the need to "self-insure" due to a limited social safety net and concerns over wealth destruction from the property downturn. Boosting consumption requires structural policy changes, not just stimulus.
The rise of a precarious gig workforce of over 200 million people directly contradicts the Communist Party's founding promise of a "dictatorship of the proletariat." This growing underclass, living with minimal security and rights, represents a societal shift towards a capitalist-style structure that the party was originally formed to overthrow, creating a deep ideological crisis.
Dubbed the "make-or-break generation," this cohort's future is pivotal. If they cannot afford homes or integrate into cities, they could cripple the housing market and depress birth rates, threatening China's long-term economic and social stability.
While China's high-tech manufacturing output soars (up 9.4%), retail sales lag significantly (up only 3.7%). This stark divergence reveals a fundamentally imbalanced economy that excels at production but fails to distribute wealth to its citizens, suppressing domestic demand and risking a future crash.
Laid-off workers are increasingly turning to gig platforms like Uber instead of filing for unemployment. This trend artificially suppresses unemployment insurance (UI) claims, making this historically reliable indicator less effective at signaling rising joblessness and the true state of the labor market.
China faces a severe labor market mismatch. Over the last five years, the number of university graduates grew by 40% to nearly 12 million. Simultaneously, the economy shed 20 million jobs, creating a surplus of educated youth with limited opportunities and suppressed wages.
Chinese policymakers champion AI as a key driver of economic productivity but appear to be underestimating its potential for social upheaval. There is little indication they are planning for the mass displacement of the gig economy workforce, who will be the first casualties of automation. This focus on technological gains over social safety nets creates a significant future political risk.
China’s economic strategy prioritizes technology and manufacturing competitiveness, assuming this will create a virtuous cycle of profits, jobs, and consumption. The key risk is that automated, high-tech manufacturing may not generate enough jobs to significantly boost household income, causing consumer spending to lag behind industrial growth.
Contrary to the image of a stable labor force, up to 80% of workers in China's largest factories during peak seasons are short-term gig workers. This systemic reliance on a transient workforce marks a significant and risky departure from the previous generation of stable migrant labor.