Beijing's political commitment to annual growth targets prevents it from allowing the economy to slow down and rebalance. Instead of fostering sustainable consumption, it must constantly stimulate investment and exports, perpetuating the very imbalances that threaten long-term stability.

Despite a property downturn subtracting nearly 1.5 percentage points from GDP, China's economy is buoyed by a hyper-competitive manufacturing sector. With cost advantages of 20-40% in key high-tech sectors, its export growth is outpacing global trade, creating a resilient but unbalanced economic picture.

China's economic success is driven by a small, hyper-competitive private sector (the top 5%). This masks a much larger, dysfunctional morass of state-owned enterprises, leading to declining overall capital productivity despite headline-grabbing advances.

China's policy to combat deflation focuses on cutting excess industrial capacity. However, this is deemed insufficient because the root cause is weak aggregate demand. A sustainable solution requires boosting consumption through social welfare, an approach policymakers seem hesitant to implement on a large scale.

Beijing's focus on AI, EVs, and batteries is primarily a national security strategy. Growth in these sectors is six times smaller than the decline in traditional industries like property, meaning they cannot offset the broader economic collapse.

China’s economic strategy prioritizes technology and manufacturing competitiveness, assuming this will create a virtuous cycle of profits, jobs, and consumption. The key risk is that automated, high-tech manufacturing may not generate enough jobs to significantly boost household income, causing consumer spending to lag behind industrial growth.

With its domestic, investment-led growth model broken, China has pivoted to an export-heavy strategy. This significant shift creates new vulnerabilities as it must fight for a shrinking pie of global demand amid rising protectionism.

Despite strong export-led growth in Asia, the benefits did not trickle down to households. Weak household income and consumption prompted governments and central banks to implement fiscal support and monetary easing. This disconnect between headline GDP and domestic demand is a critical factor for understanding Asian economic policy.

Despite rhetoric about shifting to a consumption-led economy, China's rigid annual GDP growth targets make this impossible. This political necessity forces a constant return to state-driven fixed asset investment to hit the numbers. The result is a "cha-cha" of economic policy—one step toward rebalancing, two steps back toward the old model—making any true shift short-lived.