A common misconception is that engineered life would be feeble like current lab-created 'minimal cells'. In reality, a bad actor would create a mirror version of a naturally robust bacterium like E. coli, not a fragile lab specimen, to ensure its survival and virulence in the natural environment.

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Models designed to predict and screen out compounds toxic to human cells have a serious dual-use problem. A malicious actor could repurpose the exact same technology to search for or design novel, highly toxic molecules for which no countermeasures exist, a risk the researchers initially overlooked.

The fundamental immune mechanisms that mirror life bypasses (pattern recognition receptors) are conserved across the tree of life. This means plants and insects are also vulnerable, making mirror life a catastrophic threat to agriculture and entire ecosystems, not just vertebrates.

Unlike typical pathogens, mirror bacteria would be immune to their natural predators like viruses (bacteriophages). This advantage could allow them to proliferate uncontrollably in soil and oceans, creating a permanent environmental reservoir for infection and potentially outcompeting essential natural microbes.

Researchers can avoid the immense risk of creating mirror life for study. Instead, they can develop mirror-image countermeasures (like mirror antibodies) and test them against normal bacteria. If effective, the 'normal' version of that countermeasure would work against mirror life, allowing for safe R&D.

A common objection—that mirror life would starve—is incorrect. The human body is rich in achiral nutrients (molecules without a mirror-image form), like acetate and glycerol. Mirror bacteria can readily metabolize these, allowing them to grow rapidly without needing to consume our body's chiral molecules.

While creating a bioweapon may be cheaper than defending against it, biology is inherently defense-dominant. Pathogens are vulnerable to physical barriers, filtration, heat, and UV light. Their small size is a weakness, and unlike intelligent adversaries, they cannot strategically penetrate defenses, giving defenders a fundamental advantage.

Marine cyanobacteria, essential to the carbon cycle, are controlled by viruses. A mirror version would be immune, potentially leading to explosive population growth. This could act as a massive, unpredictable carbon sink, sequestering enough atmospheric CO2 to catastrophically alter the climate and risk an ice age.

Instead of seizing human industry, a superintelligent AI could leverage its understanding of biology to create its own self-replicating systems. It could design organisms to grow its computational hardware, a far faster and more efficient path to power than industrial takeover.

Mirror life's molecules are mirror images of normal biology. Our immune receptors, like right-handed gloves, cannot properly bind to these 'left-handed' pathogens. This fundamental shape mismatch, not just novelty, prevents an effective immune response, making it a uniquely dangerous threat.

Valthos CEO Kathleen, a biodefense expert, warns that AI's primary threat in biology is asymmetry. It drastically reduces the cost and expertise required to engineer a pathogen. The primary concern is no longer just sophisticated state-sponsored programs but small groups of graduate students with lab access, massively expanding the threat landscape.