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Andre says China's 10-year yield is only 1.7% while the US pays over 5%. China is the biggest oil importer, so oil cannot explain the drop. He says low yields reflect crashing consumer confidence and severe domestic deflation after the housing bust. He compares China's response to Japan after 1989.
While the energy shock will increase input prices in China, it will not resolve the country's persistent deflationary cycle. True, sustainable reflation requires a recovery in consumer demand and an improvement in corporate profit margins, neither of which is achieved through an external cost shock.
A confluence of factors, including rising AI-driven component costs and higher oil prices, will likely flip China from a deflationary to an inflationary force on the world economy. This shift will particularly squeeze European nations, which may be forced to raise interest rates, thereby increasing their debt service costs.
China reports 5% real GDP growth while experiencing persistent deflation. This is historically unprecedented for an investment-led economy, with the only possible parallel being the 19th-century U.S. The inconsistency suggests official growth numbers are not credible.
Andre says when debt pressure hits, the US protects investors and lets the dollar take the hit, which is inflationary. China instead limited developer borrowing, let Evergrande default and liquidate, and home prices fell 22%. Chinese savers bear the losses. He calls the US approach a rescue of the financial system.
The collapse in domestic demand from the property sector has forced Chinese producers to find markets abroad. This has led to a rise in China's external surplus and deflationary pressure as firms cut prices to sell excess capacity, directly linking internal slowdown to external competitiveness.
A non-obvious consequence of the Iran conflict is the strengthening of China's position in global finance. While bond yields in the US and Europe rose, China's remained stable, making it an unlikely safe haven for global capital and giving its government more policy room to stimulate its economy.
If investors only feared 2% inflation but demand a 5% yield, the extra 3% is a risk premium. Lenders are charging the U.S. government more because they are less certain about its ability to repay debt with valuable dollars, signaling that the borrower—the U.S. itself—looks shakier.
Unlike Western economies facing severe inflationary threats from the Iran oil crisis, China is in a better position. A slight rise in inflation could actually be beneficial for its economy, helping to counteract recent deflationary pressures without alarming its central bank, the PBOC.
Contrary to popular belief, low interest rates historically indicate a weak economy with high demand for safety and liquidity. Conversely, rising rates signal expectations of economic growth or inflation, as capital seeks better returns in the real economy rather than safe government bonds.
Contrary to popular belief, falling interest rates reflect a weak economy where banks are de-risking and moving to safety, not a successful stimulus policy. China's current situation, with plunging rates and slowing growth, is a perfect real-world example of Milton Friedman's "interest rate fallacy."