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Contrary to popular belief, falling interest rates reflect a weak economy where banks are de-risking and moving to safety, not a successful stimulus policy. China's current situation, with plunging rates and slowing growth, is a perfect real-world example of Milton Friedman's "interest rate fallacy."
The current downturn in the global liquidity cycle isn't primarily due to central bank tightening. Instead, a robust real economy is "crowding out" financial markets by pulling capital away, creating an inverse relationship between the two cycles.
In a weak economy, government stimulus often fails because it's reacting to underlying fundamental problems, like a banking sector that is de-risking. Chinese data shows that as government bond issuance (stimulus) has skyrocketed, economic growth has continued to decline, proving the stimulus isn't working.
In every Fed cutting cycle since the 1980s, long-term Treasury yields have fallen. This cycle is the first to break that 100% consistent pattern, indicating the Fed's primary tool for stimulating the economy is no longer effective.
A common misconception is that Fed rate cuts lower all borrowing costs. However, aggressive short-term cuts can signal future inflation, causing the 10-year Treasury yield to rise. This increases long-term rates for mortgages and corporate debt, counteracting the intended economic stimulus.
Monetary stimulus like low interest rates isn't a guaranteed fix for a stagnant economy. As seen in Japan, if a population's psychology shifts toward debt aversion after a major bust, they will refuse to borrow and spend regardless of how cheap money becomes, trapping the economy.
Despite nominal interest rates at zero for years, the 2010s economy saw stubbornly high unemployment and below-target inflation. This suggests monetary policy was restrictive relative to the era's very low "neutral rate" (R-star). The low R-star meant even zero percent rates were not stimulative enough, challenging the narrative of an "easy money" decade.
Counterintuitively, Fed rate cuts could slow the economy. They would reduce the substantial income stream currently paid to the 'moneyed class' holding trillions in short-term instruments tied to the Fed's policy rate, effectively reversing a form of fiscal stimulus.
Contrary to popular belief, low interest rates historically indicate a weak economy with high demand for safety and liquidity. Conversely, rising rates signal expectations of economic growth or inflation, as capital seeks better returns in the real economy rather than safe government bonds.
Contrary to intuition, a gradual pace of Fed rate cuts is often preferable for credit markets. It signals a stable economy, whereas aggressive cuts typically coincide with significant economic deterioration, which hurts credit performance despite the monetary stimulus.
The convergence of positive global growth indicators raises a crucial question for monetary policy. If the economic backdrop is genuinely strengthening, as these diverse signals suggest, it undermines the justification for central banks to implement further rate cuts. This creates a potential divergence between improving economic reality and market expectations for easing.