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Andre says when debt pressure hits, the US protects investors and lets the dollar take the hit, which is inflationary. China instead limited developer borrowing, let Evergrande default and liquidate, and home prices fell 22%. Chinese savers bear the losses. He calls the US approach a rescue of the financial system.
In China's state-backed system, the government is expected to prevent collapses from external shocks. The real danger of a crisis comes from attempting reforms that disrupt the status quo and reveal underlying losses, making managed decay a more politically palatable option for leaders.
Instead of an explicit default, governments often employ 'financial repression.' This strategy, a 'soft default,' involves policies that lead to inflation, steadily eroding the purchasing power of citizens' savings and effectively stealing their economic value to manage national debt.
Instead of a transparent default, the U.S. government's strategy is to devalue its debt by keeping interest rates below inflation. This policy, known as 'financial repression,' erodes the real value of the dollar, effectively transferring wealth from savers and bondholders to the government to pay down its massive debt.
Andre says mortgage rates above 7% yet US home prices remain higher than a year earlier. He argues housing is the collateral foundation for the whole banking system, so no matter who is in charge, they will not allow it to fail. That keeps prices supported.
The policy restricted developer borrowing to curb speculation but failed to address the core drivers: households' need for a savings vehicle and local governments' dependency on land sales for revenue. By attacking the intermediary, the policy caused a crisis without solving the fundamental problem.
The collapse of Evergrande, China's largest developer, wasn't just a corporate failure; it was a systemic financial crisis. The aftermath—impaired policy tools, deflation, and slower growth—is consistent with the consequences of a major crisis, even without a "Lehman moment."
The widely reported collapse of China's housing market is not an organic crisis but a state-directed reallocation of capital. By instructing banks to prioritize industrial capacity over mortgages, the government is deliberately shifting funds away from a speculative real estate bubble and into strategic sectors like microchips to counter US sanctions and build self-sufficiency.
Andre speculates that printing money to erase debt is theft from savers, but during a disaster it can be sold as necessary rescue. After World War II, the US capped bond yields at 2.5% while inflation hit 19%, shrinking the debt burden. The pandemic repeated a similar trick.
The U.S. is increasingly using currency and debt markets to smooth out GDP growth and control economic volatility, mirroring China's state-managed approach. This creates a superficially stable economy but centralizes systemic risk in the Treasury market, which serves as the ultimate 'exhaust valve.'
Andre says China's 10-year yield is only 1.7% while the US pays over 5%. China is the biggest oil importer, so oil cannot explain the drop. He says low yields reflect crashing consumer confidence and severe domestic deflation after the housing bust. He compares China's response to Japan after 1989.