The deleveraging that followed the 2008 financial crisis—simpler bank balance sheets, more corporate cash, and tighter lending—created a multi-year environment where corporate bond supply was constrained. This scarcity insulated markets from supply-driven volatility, a condition that is only now ending.
Contrary to the belief that hot credit markets encourage high leverage, data shows high-yield borrowers currently have leverage levels around four times, the lowest in two decades. This statistical reality contrasts sharply with gloomy market sentiment driven by anecdotal defaults, suggesting underlying strength in the asset class.
Massive AI and cloud infrastructure spending by tech giants is flooding the market with new debt. For the first time since the 2008 crisis, this oversupply, not macroeconomic fears, is becoming a primary driver of market volatility and repricing risk for existing corporate bonds.
Market stability is an evolutionary process where each crisis acts as a learning event. The 2008 crash taught policymakers how to respond with tools like credit facilities, enabling a much faster, more effective response to the COVID-19 shock. Crises are not just failures but necessary reps that improve systemic resilience.
Unlike the post-GFC era, governments now lack the fiscal and monetary flexibility to cushion every economic shock due to high debt levels. This is forcing global markets to trade on their own fundamentals again, creating volatility and relative value opportunities reminiscent of the pre-2008 era.
Michael Mauboussin's research reveals a surprising trend. Despite a long period of low interest rates, non-financial corporate debt to total capital is around 15% today, significantly lower than the historical average of 26%. This suggests balance sheets are stronger than commonly perceived.
While default risk exists, the more pressing problem for credit investors is a severe supply-demand imbalance. A shortage of new M&A and corporate issuance, combined with massive sideline capital (e.g., $8T in money markets), keeps spreads historically tight and makes finding attractive opportunities the main challenge.
Credit spreads are becoming an unreliable economic signal. The shift of issuance to private markets reduces the public supply, while the Federal Reserve's 2020 intervention in corporate debt markets permanently altered how investors price default probability.
The expected wave of M&A and LBOs has not materialized, leaving the deal pipeline thin. This lack of new debt supply provides a strong supportive backdrop for credit spreads, allowing the market to absorb geopolitical volatility more easily than fundamentals would otherwise suggest.
For 40 years, falling rates pushed 'safe' bond funds into increasingly risky assets to chase yield. With rates now rising, these mis-categorized portfolios are the most vulnerable part of the financial system. A crisis in credit or sovereign debt is more probable than a stock-market-led crash.
Enormous government borrowing is absorbing so much capital that it's crowding out corporate debt issuance, particularly for smaller businesses. This lack of new corporate supply leads to ironically tight credit spreads for large borrowers. This dynamic mirrors the intense concentration seen in public equity markets.