Credit spreads are becoming an unreliable economic signal. The shift of issuance to private markets reduces the public supply, while the Federal Reserve's 2020 intervention in corporate debt markets permanently altered how investors price default probability.
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Official liquidity measures like Fed balance sheet levels are too slow to be tradable. A better approach is to monitor the symptoms of liquidity conditions in real-time market data. Indicators like SOFR spreads, commercial paper spreads, and unusual yield curve shapes reveal the health of private credit creation.
Default rates are not uniform. High-yield bonds are low due to a 2020 "cleansing." Leveraged loans show elevated defaults due to higher rates. Private credit defaults are masked but may be as high as 6%, indicated by "bad PIK" amendments, suggesting hidden stress.
The credit market appears healthy based on tight average spreads, but this is misleading. A strong top 90% of the market pulls the average down, while the bottom 10% faces severe distress, with loans "dropping like a stone." The weight of prolonged high borrowing costs is creating a clear divide between healthy and struggling companies.
While default risk exists, the more pressing problem for credit investors is a severe supply-demand imbalance. A shortage of new M&A and corporate issuance, combined with massive sideline capital (e.g., $8T in money markets), keeps spreads historically tight and makes finding attractive opportunities the main challenge.
The rise of electronic and portfolio trading has made public credit markets as liquid as equity markets. This 'equitification' has compressed spreads by eliminating the historical illiquidity premium, forcing investors into private markets like private credit to find comparable yield.
A consistent 2-5% of Europe's public high-yield market restructures annually. The conspicuous absence of a parallel event in private markets, which often finance similar companies, suggests that opacity and mark-to-model valuations may be concealing significant, unacknowledged credit risk in private portfolios.
Official non-accrual rates understate private credit distress. A truer default rate emerges when including covenant defaults and 'bad' Payment-in-Kind interest (PIK) from forced renegotiations. These hidden metrics suggest distress levels are comparable to, if not higher than, public markets.
Judging the credit market by its overall index spread is misleading. The significant gap between the tightest and widest spreads (high dispersion) reveals that the market is rewarding quality and punishing uncertainty. This makes individual credit selection far more important than a top-down market view.
The two credit markets are converging, creating a symbiotic relationship beneficial to both borrowers and investors. Instead of competing, they serve different needs, and savvy investors should combine them opportunistically rather than pitting them against each other.
Enormous government borrowing is absorbing so much capital that it's crowding out corporate debt issuance, particularly for smaller businesses. This lack of new corporate supply leads to ironically tight credit spreads for large borrowers. This dynamic mirrors the intense concentration seen in public equity markets.
