Unlike the post-GFC era, governments now lack the fiscal and monetary flexibility to cushion every economic shock due to high debt levels. This is forcing global markets to trade on their own fundamentals again, creating volatility and relative value opportunities reminiscent of the pre-2008 era.
When national debt grows too large, an economy enters "fiscal dominance." The central bank loses its ability to manage the economy, as raising rates causes hyperinflation to cover debt payments while lowering them creates massive asset bubbles, leaving no good options.
Many developed countries are approaching their fiscal limits, a state Bridgewater's Co-CIO frames as "we're all Brazil now." Unlike Germany, where fiscal spending boosts the economy, for countries like the UK, such actions become counterproductive—the currency falls and interest rates spike. The US is drifting toward this line, losing its policy flexibility.
A country's fiscal health is becoming a primary driver of its currency's value, at times overriding central bank actions. Currencies like the British Pound face a "fiscal risk premium" due to borrowing concerns, while the Swedish Krona benefits from a positive budget outlook. This creates a clear divergence between fiscal "haves" and "have-nots."
A condition called "fiscal dominance," where massive government debt exists, prevents the central bank from raising interest rates to cool speculation. This forces a flood of cheap money into the market, which seeks high returns in narrative-driven assets like AI because safer options can't keep pace with inflation.
'Fiscal dominance' occurs when government spending, not central bank policy, dictates the economy. In this state, the Federal Reserve's actions, like interest rate cuts, become largely ineffective for long-term stability. They can create short-term sentiment shifts but cannot overcome the overwhelming force of massive government deficit spending.
Large, ongoing fiscal deficits are now the primary driver of the U.S. economy, a factor many macro analysts are missing. This sustained government spending creates a higher floor for economic activity and asset prices, rendering traditional monetary policy indicators less effective and making the economy behave more like a fiscally dominant state.
When countries run large, structural government deficits, their policy options become limited. Historically, this state of 'fiscal dominance' leads to the implementation of capital controls and other financial frictions to prevent capital flight and manage the currency, increasing risks for investors.
Enormous government borrowing is absorbing so much capital that it's crowding out corporate debt issuance, particularly for smaller businesses. This lack of new corporate supply leads to ironically tight credit spreads for large borrowers. This dynamic mirrors the intense concentration seen in public equity markets.
The era of constant central bank intervention has rendered traditional value investing irrelevant. Market movements are now dictated by liquidity and stimulus flows, not by fundamental analysis of a company's intrinsic value. Investors must now track the 'liquidity impulse' to succeed.
The U.S. government's debt is so large that the Federal Reserve is trapped. Raising interest rates would trigger a government default, while cutting them would further inflate the 'everything bubble.' Either path leads to a systemic crisis, a situation economists call 'fiscal dominance.'