China's leaders view the West's debate over AI's existential risks as a self-imposed weakness. By rejecting this "doomer mentality," China can maintain a laser focus on rapid AI deployment for economic and military superiority, while the US risks abdicating its lead due to internal panic and debate.

China's seemingly contradictory AI policy—promoting both openness and strict control—stems from its view of AI as a "normal technology" akin to the internet. Unlike some in the West who see it as an existential risk, Beijing sees a technology that should be diffused as widely as possible for economic gain, while managing its risks with conventional tools like robust cybersecurity.

While aware of existential risks, China's primary AI safety focus is on immediate threats like cybersecurity and maintaining state control. The government worries about agents 'escaping sandboxes' and losing control within its borders, prioritizing this over the more abstract risk of rogue superintelligence that dominates Western discussions.

In major speeches, Chinese President Xi Jinping has used language that aligns strongly with the AI safety community, asking how to prevent "loss of control" and demanding AI be kept "under human control." This rhetoric is arguably more explicit on existential risk themes than that of most prominent American politicians.

Contrary to fears that U.S. regulation cedes ground to China, the CCP has strong self-interested reasons to regulate AI. It is highly concerned with internal stability and control, cracking down on AI-driven social disruption and the risk of domestic cyberattacks, independent of Western policy.

The argument that the U.S. must race to build superintelligence before China is flawed. The Chinese Communist Party's primary goal is control. An uncontrollable AI poses a direct existential threat to their power, making them more likely to heavily regulate or halt its development rather than recklessly pursue it.

Unlike the Western debate focused on existential risk, China's primary AI concerns are geopolitical and domestic. Officials view US AI firms as potential tools for espionage and data theft, focusing regulation on societal control and data security. This fundamental difference in priorities is crucial for understanding international AI negotiations.

The Chinese government perceives less risk from releasing open-weight models because it has a demonstrated ability to censor and control its domestic internet. They believe that if a model proves dangerous, they can effectively scrub it from circulation and track down illicit use, a capacity Western governments lack.

China's rapid AI development is facing internal pressure from its own security state. Concerns are rising over the leakage of military secrets through Western models used via proxies and the general risks of uncontrolled AI, leading to more cautious release strategies.