The common Western argument that regulating AI is futile because "China will never slow down" is a misconception. China's government and research community actively engage with AI safety, even implementing policies that have slowed down their own companies in the name of safety.

China is crafting a global AI governance narrative emphasizing human control, multilateralism, and openness. This directly opposes the perceived unilateral, capitalistic, and AGI-focused approach of Silicon Valley, positioning China as a more responsible global leader in AI.

Top Chinese officials use the metaphor "if the braking system isn't under control, you can't really step on the accelerator with confidence." This reflects a core belief that robust safety measures enable, rather than hinder, the aggressive development and deployment of powerful AI systems, viewing the two as synergistic.

China's seemingly contradictory AI policy—promoting both openness and strict control—stems from its view of AI as a "normal technology" akin to the internet. Unlike some in the West who see it as an existential risk, Beijing sees a technology that should be diffused as widely as possible for economic gain, while managing its risks with conventional tools like robust cybersecurity.

The narrative that AI could be catastrophic ('summoning the demon') is used strategically. It creates a sense of danger that justifies why a small, elite group must maintain tight control over the technology, thereby warding off both regulation and competition.

In China, academics have significant influence on policymaking, partly due to a cultural tradition that highly values scholars. Experts deeply concerned about existential AI risks have briefed the highest levels of government, suggesting that policy may be less susceptible to capture by commercial tech interests compared to the West.

The argument that the U.S. must race to build superintelligence before China is flawed. The Chinese Communist Party's primary goal is control. An uncontrollable AI poses a direct existential threat to their power, making them more likely to heavily regulate or halt its development rather than recklessly pursue it.

The AI competition is not a race to develop the most powerful technology, but a race to see which nation is better at steering and governing that power. Developing an uncontrollable 'AI bazooka' first is not a win; true advantage comes from creating systems that strengthen, rather than weaken, one's own society.

Xi concluded his AI speech by quoting the "Discourses on Salt and Iron," an 81 BC text about the Han dynasty's struggle to govern the privatized salt and iron industries. This historical parallel suggests China's current AI governance debate is a modern iteration of a centuries-old tension between private innovation and state extraction/control.