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While founders can abandon traditional startups, they can't easily sell their illiquid shares. In crypto, permissionless secondary markets allow a malicious founder to instantly sell project tokens (a "rug pull"), extracting all value before investors can react.
Crypto was unique for allowing retail investors access before Wall Street. Now, the market is dominated by venture capitalists who launch tokens at inflated valuations with long unlocking schedules, effectively using retail buyers as exit liquidity.
The industry's failure to build trust isn't due to a few bad actors. It's a systemic issue rooted in the absence of punitive consequences for misrepresenting data, such as overstating revenue. Unlike public markets where this is criminal, crypto's reliance on self-policing has proven ineffective.
When founders cash out millions early, it can create a disconnect. They become rich while their team and investors are not, which can reduce their hunger and create a 'moral hazard.' The motivation may shift from building a generation-defining company to preserving their newfound wealth.
Bitcoin's recent crash is attributed to extreme leverage unique to crypto, with platforms letting users buy $100 of Bitcoin with only $1 of their own money. This amplifies gains, creating bubbles, but more dangerously, it amplifies losses, forcing panic selling and cascading liquidations that can erase huge gains almost instantly.
To prevent founders from dumping tokens, Bittensor is exploring smart contracts that lock owner tokens as a condition of operating a subnet. Control could be tied to who locks the most tokens, codifying long-term conviction and replacing trust with on-chain governance.
The Bittensor incident shows how well-designed incentive systems can fail when a leader gains control over a large amount of liquid assets. The temptation of sudden, massive success can override the intended alignment, leading to a 'rug pull' for personal gain.
Many secondary market SPVs don't grant investors direct ownership of shares. Instead, an employee holds the stock in a separate entity and sells shares of that entity. This structure can allow the employee to sell the underlying stock without the SPV investors' consent, introducing a major risk.
The number of founders taking secondary liquidity after their seed round is twice as high as the 2021 peak. While this de-risks the journey for founders, there is almost no parallel liquidity offered to early employees, creating a growing divide in early-stage risk and reward.
The primary risk in private markets isn't necessarily financial loss, but rather informational disadvantage ('opacity') and the inability to pivot quickly ('illiquidity'). In contrast, public markets' main risk is short-term price volatility that can impact performance metrics. This highlights that each market type requires a fundamentally different risk management approach.
In competitive funding rounds, investors may rely on the diligence of other VCs in the deal. This is a major pitfall, as founders can leverage momentum and social proof to dissuade individual scrutiny. This "diligence by proxy" enabled frauds like FTX and Theranos.