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A growing frustration for LPs is the tendency for GPs to breach their stated "hard cap" by asking for last-minute increases. This practice undermines the credibility of the fund's size strategy and turns a key underwriting parameter into a negotiable figure, perverting the term's meaning.

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A common mistake for emerging managers is pitching LPs solely on the potential for huge returns. Institutional LPs are often more concerned with how a fund's specific strategy, size, and focus align with their overall portfolio construction. Demonstrating a clear, disciplined strategy is more compelling than promising an 8x return.

When a General Partner offers a GP-led secondary, they shift the crucial decision of when to sell an asset from themselves—the expert—to the Limited Partner. This undermines a core tenet of the LP-GP relationship, as LPs lack the deep asset-level knowledge to make an informed sell-or-hold decision.

Many fund managers approach capital raising by broadcasting their own "unique" story. However, the most successful ones operate like great listeners, first seeking to understand the specific needs and constraints of the Limited Partner (LP) and then aligning their value proposition accordingly.

The traditional PE model—GPs exit assets and LPs reinvest—is breaking down. GPs no longer trust that overallocated LPs will "round trip" capital into their next fund. This creates a powerful incentive to use continuation vehicles to retain assets, grow fee-related earnings, and avoid the fundraising market.

The strength of a GP-LP relationship isn't measured by co-invest rights or fee breaks. It's demonstrated when a GP offers valuable advice or connections that improve the LP's overall portfolio, even when there's no direct financial gain for the GP. This uncompensated help is the hallmark of true partnership.

The primary risk to a VC fund's performance isn't its absolute size but rather a dramatic increase (e.g., doubling) from one fund to the next. This forces firms to change their strategy and write larger checks than their conviction muscle is built for.

The inability to return capital to LPs constrains new fundraising, creating an environment that cannot support the thousands of PE funds operating today. This will trigger a shakeout of weaker GPs, while the top 10 funds, already capturing 36% of capital, further consolidate their dominance.

Lara Banks suggests that emerging fund managers should proactively ask LPs about their specific criteria for success. This conversation aligns expectations early, clarifies performance benchmarks for future funds, and prevents misalignment between the GP's strategy and the LP's evaluation framework.

VCs face a paradox with LPs. For early funds, LPs complain about the lack of distributions (DPI). For later funds, after the VC has made money, LPs question if they are 'still hungry enough,' creating a no-win situation.

It's easy for a General Partner (GP) to be a good partner when markets are strong and profitable. A GP's true character, integrity, and alignment with Limited Partners (LPs) are only tested when a downturn forces difficult conversations about shrinking profits and unmet expectations.