The catalyst for a private credit crisis will be publicly traded, daily NAV funds. These vehicles promise investors daily liquidity while holding assets that are completely illiquid. This mismatch creates the perfect conditions for a "run on the bank" scenario during a market downturn.

A flood of capital into private credit has dramatically increased competition, causing the yield spread over public markets to shrink from 3-4% to less than 1%. This compression raises serious questions about whether investors are still being adequately compensated for illiquidity risk.

The yield premium for private credit has shrunk, meaning investors are no longer adequately compensated for the additional illiquidity, concentration, and credit risk they assume. Publicly traded high-yield bonds and bank loans now offer comparable returns with better diversification and liquidity, questioning the rationale for allocating to private credit.

Firms like Blue Owl showcase their role in the AI boom, raising billions for data centers. This forward-looking narrative masks a critical risk: they are simultaneously blocking investor redemptions in older, less glamorous funds. This reveals a dangerous liquidity mismatch where retail investors are trapped in the illiquid present while being sold a high-growth future.

Unlike illiquid private equity, private credit funds provide a steady stream of cash flow through coupon payments. This self-liquidating feature perfectly solves the liquidity needs of the private wealth channel, making it a far more suitable and popular alternative asset for that investor base.

The explosion in the number of solo GPs and small VC funds is not primarily fueled by institutions, but by a growing pool of individual and high-net-worth capital. This new LP base will demand fund structures with better liquidity and less administrative burden.

While fears of retail investors gambling on venture capital exist, the primary growth in retail alternatives is in yield-oriented strategies like private credit and infrastructure. These products meet the demand for high current income and lower volatility, especially for those in or near retirement, making them a more logical first step.

Jeff Gundlach argues private credit's attractive Sharpe ratio is misleading. Assets aren't priced daily, hiding risk. When an asset is finally marked, it can go from a valuation of 100 to zero in weeks, exposing the “low volatility” as a dangerous fallacy.

Goldman's product strategy for alternatives is tiered by wealth. While ultra-high-net-worth clients see a broad spectrum of products, the high-net-worth segment is primarily offered yield-based funds like private credit. The compelling quarterly cash distributions are easier to understand and help psychologically de-risk the investment for this audience.