Ultra-late-stage companies like Ramp and Stripe represent a new category: "private as public." They could be public but choose not to be. Investors should expect returns similar to mid-cap public stocks (e.g., 30-40% YoY), not the 2-3x multiples of traditional venture rounds. The asset class is different, so the return profile must be too.

Historically, private equity was pursued for its potential outperformance (alpha). Today, with shrinking public markets, its main value is providing diversification and access to a growing universe of private companies that are no longer available on public exchanges. This makes it a core portfolio completion tool.

Widespread adoption of alternatives in "off-the-shelf" target-date funds faces immense inertia. The initial traction will come from large corporations with sophisticated internal investment teams creating custom target-date funds and from individual managed account platforms, which are far more nimble.

Contrary to the perception that alternatives are complex, their core business models are often simpler than many public market instruments. The concept of direct lending (loaning money and collecting interest) is more straightforward for a retail investor to grasp than the mechanics of a structured note sold by a bank with embedded options.

The conversation around adding alternatives to 401(k) plans is not about offering standalone private equity funds. The practical implementation is embedding this exposure within target-date funds, often as collective investment trusts, which mitigates liquidity risk and simplifies the investment decision for participants.

For the sophisticated custom target-date funds that will be early adopters, private credit is the easiest first step. Unlike private equity, some private credit products can already be marked daily. This operational readiness, combined with liquidity from distributions, makes it the path of least resistance.

Increased retail access to alternatives helps level the playing field between individual and institutional investors. However, capturing this opportunity favors large, scaled managers like Blackstone and Apollo who can afford brand marketing and distribution. This dynamic accelerates industry consolidation, widening the gap between mega-firms and smaller managers.

Instead of viewing the flood of private wealth as competition for deals, savvy institutional investors can capitalize on it. Opportunities exist to seed new retail-focused vehicles to gain economics, buy GP stakes in managers entering the wealth channel, or use new evergreen funds as a source of secondary market liquidity.

Ackman's investment in Brookfield provides indirect access to private real estate, infrastructure like toll roads and ports, and private credit. This serves as a model for retail investors to gain exposure to institutional-grade alternative assets through a single, publicly traded stock, which is typically inaccessible to them.