Alan Chang argues that incentivizing metrics can have negative second-order effects. For example, a recruiter bonused on 'hires per month' may be motivated to convince hiring managers to lower the talent bar just to hit their target, which is detrimental to the company's long-term goals.

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To prevent engineers from gaming output-based pay, 10X assigns a "Technical Strategist" to each project. The engineer is paid for output, but the strategist is incentivized by client retention and account growth (NRR), creating a healthy tension that ensures high-quality work is delivered.

CROs are often blamed for missed targets, but the root cause is often a flawed hiring plan from the CEO. Rushing to hire reps without adequate ramp time leads to B-player hires, immense pressure from managers, a toxic "horse whipping" culture, and ultimately, missed numbers.

Focusing on individual performance metrics can be counterproductive. As seen in the "super chicken" experiment, top individual performers often succeed by suppressing others. This lowers team collaboration and harms long-term group output, which can be up to 160% more productive than a group of siloed high-achievers.

When revenue leaders offload hiring to HR, they lose control over the core attributes of their team. This creates inconsistent talent quality across the organization, weakening the entire sales function. The leader is responsible for the 'DNA' of their team, and abdicating this duty leads to poor performance.

According to Goodhart's Law, when a measure becomes a target, it ceases to be a good measure. If you incentivize employees on AI-driven metrics like 'emails sent,' they will optimize for the number, not quality, corrupting the data and giving false signals of productivity.

Setting rigid targets incentivizes employees to present favorable numbers, even subconsciously. This "performance theater" discourages them from investigating negative results, which are often the source of valuable learning. The muscle for detective work atrophies, and real problems remain hidden beneath good-looking metrics.

A common OKR failure is assigning teams high-level business metrics (like ARR) which they can only contribute to, not directly influence. Success requires focusing on influenceable customer behaviors while demonstrating how they correlate to the company's broader contribution-level goals.

Salespeople's biggest frustration with comp plans is being held accountable for outcomes they can't directly influence. This perceived unfairness is a primary driver of attrition, making it critical to align incentives strictly with a seller's direct responsibilities and control.

Bending Spoons uses a radical compensation model: fixed salaries with no bonuses or performance-based incentives. The philosophy is that hiring for high integrity and professional pride fosters better alignment than complex incentive systems, which are costly, create perverse incentives, and hinder collaborative problem-solving.

Teams often self-limit output because they know overperformance will simply raise future targets to unsustainable levels. This "prison of expectations" incentivizes predictable mediocrity over breakthrough results, as employees actively manage goals to avoid future failure.