While debt covenants are weakening, investing in large public companies reduces this risk. Their need to maintain good credit for shareholders, board members, and business counterparties serves as a strong, implicit covenant, discouraging risky cash extraction common in private equity-owned firms.

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Unlike equity investors hunting for uncapped upside, debt lenders have a fixed return and are intolerant to losing principal. This forces them to be paranoid about downside risk and worst-case scenarios. Their diligence process is often more thorough and thoughtful, providing a different and rigorous lens on the business.

As private credit funds absorb riskier, smaller deals, the public high-yield market is left with larger, more stable companies. This migration has improved the overall quality and lowered default rates for public high-yield bonds, creating a performance divergence.

Aggressive debt restructuring, or 'liability management,' is more common in public credit markets due to weaker documentation. Private credit documents typically have stronger covenant protections that prevent borrowers from layering new debt ahead of existing lenders or stripping collateral, reducing this specific risk.

Official non-accrual rates understate private credit distress. A truer default rate emerges when including covenant defaults and 'bad' Payment-in-Kind interest (PIK) from forced renegotiations. These hidden metrics suggest distress levels are comparable to, if not higher than, public markets.

Contrary to the narrative that PE firms create leaner, more efficient companies, the data reveals a starkly different reality. The debt-loading and cost-cutting tactics inherent in the PE model dramatically increase a portfolio company's risk of failure.

A sign of eroding discipline, private credit underwriters are beginning to offer covenant-lite deals, once unthinkable in a market known for strong investor protections. This shift indicates that intense competition for deals is forcing lenders to lower underwriting standards, mirroring a late-cycle trend previously seen in public markets.

A significant shift in corporate finance strategy has occurred: companies no longer universally strive for an investment-grade (IG) rating. Many firms, including 'fallen angels' downgraded from IG, are content to operate with a high-yield rating, finding the higher borrowing costs acceptable for their business models.

CoreWeave mitigates the risk of its massive debt load by securing long-term contracts from investment-grade customers like Microsoft *before* building new infrastructure. These contracts serve as collateral, ensuring that each project's financing is backed by guaranteed revenue streams, making their growth model far less speculative.

The popular narrative of a looming 'wall of maturities' is a fallacy used in investor presentations. Good companies proactively refinance their debt well ahead of time. It's only the poorly managed or fundamentally flawed businesses that are unable to refinance and face a maturity crisis, a fact the market quickly identifies.

Beyond direct competition, the private credit market serves a crucial function for public markets by absorbing lower-quality companies that can no longer refinance publicly. This migration of weaker credits helps cleanse the public high-yield and loan markets, removing potential defaults and improving overall portfolio quality.