A significant shift in corporate finance strategy has occurred: companies no longer universally strive for an investment-grade (IG) rating. Many firms, including 'fallen angels' downgraded from IG, are content to operate with a high-yield rating, finding the higher borrowing costs acceptable for their business models.
While lower rates seem beneficial for leveraged companies, the context is critical. The Federal Reserve typically cuts rates in response to a weakening economy. This economic downturn usually harms issuer fundamentals more than the lower borrowing costs can help, making rate-cutting cycles a net negative for high-yield credit.
The primary threat to the high-yield market isn't a wave of corporate defaults, but rather a reversion of the compressed risk premium that investors demand. This premium has been historically low, and a return to normal levels presents a significant valuation risk, even if fundamentals remain stable.
Contrary to the belief that hot credit markets encourage high leverage, data shows high-yield borrowers currently have leverage levels around four times, the lowest in two decades. This statistical reality contrasts sharply with gloomy market sentiment driven by anecdotal defaults, suggesting underlying strength in the asset class.
The credit market appears healthy based on tight average spreads, but this is misleading. A strong top 90% of the market pulls the average down, while the bottom 10% faces severe distress, with loans "dropping like a stone." The weight of prolonged high borrowing costs is creating a clear divide between healthy and struggling companies.
A credit rating is just a starting point. Crossmark's Victoria Fernandez uses an Alcoa example to show how their independent balance sheet analysis revealed the company could still service its debt, allowing them to hold a downgraded bond to maturity and avoid realizing a significant loss.
Corporations are increasingly shifting from asset-heavy to capital-light models, often through complex transactions like sale-leasebacks. This strategic trend creates bespoke financing needs that are better served by the flexible solutions of private credit providers than by rigid public markets.
The CCC-rated segment of the high-yield market should not be treated as a simple down-in-quality allocation. Instead, it's a "stock picker's" environment where opportunities are found in specific, idiosyncratic situations with high conviction, such as a turnaround story or a mispriced part of a company's capital structure.
The modern high-yield market is structurally different from its past. It's now composed of higher-quality issuers and has a shorter duration profile. While this limits potential upside returns compared to historical cycles, it also provides a cushion, capping the potential downside risk for investors.
Despite higher spreads in the loan market, high-yield bonds are currently seen as a more stable investment. Leveraged loans face risks from LME activity, higher defaults, and investor outflows as the Fed cuts rates (reducing their floating-rate appeal). Fixed-rate high-yield bonds are more insulated from these specific pressures.
The gap between high-yield and investment-grade credit is shrinking. The average high-yield rating is now BB, while investment-grade is BBB—the closest they've ever been. This fundamental convergence in quality helps explain why the yield spread between the two asset classes is also at a historical low, reflecting market efficiency rather than just irrational exuberance.