Alan Waxman saw how 10 siloed Goldman Sachs investing groups made contradictory, costly bets during the 2001 telecom bust. This direct observation of dysfunctional "fiefdoms" led him to build Sixth Street with a mandatory, collaborative "one team" structure to ensure cross-functional insight and avoid repeating those same mistakes.

To ensure genuine collaboration across funds, Centerbridge structures compensation so a "substantial minority" of an individual's pay comes from other areas of the firm. This economic incentive forces a firm-wide perspective and makes being "part of one team" a financial reality, not just a cultural slogan.

Effective due diligence isn't a checklist, but the collection of many small data points—revenue, team retention, customer love, CVC interest. A strong investment is a "beam" where all points align positively. Any misalignment creates doubt and likely signals a "no," adhering to the "if it's not a hell yes, it's a no" rule.

To avoid the trap of raising ever-larger funds and being forced to invest, Sixth Street created 'Tao,' a $30B cross-platform vehicle. It acts as an overlay, allowing smaller, specialized funds to access large-scale capital for specific deals without distorting their individual investment strategies or mandates.

To ensure robust decision-making, Eclipse requires that if a partner feels strongly against a potential investment, they must join the deal team alongside the champions. This forces a direct confrontation of the risks and ensures that by the time an investment is made, all major concerns have been addressed.

Large private equity firms are long on capital but short on deal origination. Ted Seides suggests a firm like Blackstone could adopt the Millennium hedge fund model: acquiring specialized deal teams and plugging them into a centralized risk and capital platform, effectively becoming a multi-manager PE firm.

In a world of commoditized capital, offering a full suite of solutions creates a competitive advantage. By providing fund investments, co-investments, secondary liquidity, and portfolio company debt, a firm becomes an indispensable strategic partner to PE sponsors, generating proprietary and superior deal flow.

Structuring compensation around a single, firm-wide P&L, rather than individual deal performance, eliminates internal competition. It forces a culture of true collaboration, as everyone's success is tied together. The system is maintained as a meritocracy by removing underperformers from the 'boat.'

Sequoia's internal data shows consensus is irrelevant to investment success. A deal with strong advocates (voting '9') and strong detractors (voting '1') is preferable to one where everyone is mildly positive (a '6'). The presence of passionate conviction, even amid dissent, is the critical signal for pursuing outlier returns.