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Miles Dieffenbach says multi-stage firms cannot use secondaries at scale. Selling half a stake might return only a tenth of the fund while damaging the relationship with a founder who is raising again, so they must chase hundred-billion-dollar IPOs for the math to work. That is why secondary liquidity is awkward for them.

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The majority of entrepreneurs who take seed money from large, multi-stage funds are ultimately harmed. The junior investor who championed them often moves on, leaving the company "orphaned" within the firm. Without an internal champion, they lose the mandate for crucial follow-on funding when they inevitably miss aggressive growth targets.

VCs are generally comfortable with founders taking a small amount of secondary capital ($5M-$10M) to secure personal finances, as it can free them up to take bigger risks. However, selling beyond the $10M threshold is viewed as unacceptable and signals a lack of long-term commitment to the business.

When founders cash out millions early, it can create a disconnect. They become rich while their team and investors are not, which can reduce their hunger and create a 'moral hazard.' The motivation may shift from building a generation-defining company to preserving their newfound wealth.

Rather than forcing companies into public markets, robust secondary transaction mechanisms allow founders and long-tenured employees to access liquidity via tenders and secondary sales without filing an IPO. This structural shift is directly enabling high-performing companies to push their hold periods past the current 14-year average.

Vested works directly with employees because startups find small, one-off secondary transactions burdensome due to legal fees and cap table complexity. However, this dynamic inverts at scale. Once Vested facilitates millions in transactions for a single company's stock, the startup has a strong incentive to partner on a formal liquidity program.

The 500th largest venture exit over the past 25 years cleared around $700 million, while exits around $200 million to $300 million remain life-changing for founders. Mega-funds cannot register meaningful returns from these non-outlier exits, creating structural friction with founders.

Rather than making emotional decisions, top VCs now use a formulaic approach to secondaries (e.g., "sell 15% of a position to return 0.5x of the fund"). This codification makes the process transparent to both LPs, who want to see distributions, and founders, removing guesswork.

Miles Dieffenbach says early-stage funds can sell secondaries, but an opportunity fund complicates it. Taking money out of the early fund while putting new capital into the opportunity fund is a huge conflict; Nick asks how investing net new while selling an existing fund is not a conflict.

To generate returns on a $10B acquisition, a PE firm needs a $25B exit, which often means an IPO. They must underwrite this IPO at a discount to public comps, despite having paid a 30% premium to acquire the company, creating a significant initial value gap to overcome from day one.

While critics point to public funds trading below Net Asset Value (NAV), selling a stake in a traditional VC fund on the secondary market often requires a 50% discount. This reframes the conversation around liquidity, making the public fund model more attractive by comparison.