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The majority of entrepreneurs who take seed money from large, multi-stage funds are ultimately harmed. The junior investor who championed them often moves on, leaving the company "orphaned" within the firm. Without an internal champion, they lose the mandate for crucial follow-on funding when they inevitably miss aggressive growth targets.
For a seed fund, the initial check is less critical than subsequent follow-on decisions. Driving top-tier returns requires a reserve-heavy model to pile capital into the 5-10% of portfolio companies that demonstrate breakout potential, as these few winners will generate the lion's share of returns.
Benchmark learned that large funds create an "overhang of misfit" with the practice of early-stage investing. The pressure to deploy massive capital volumes conflicts with the hands-on, shoulder-to-shoulder partnership that early founders need, leading to less joy and purpose.
Large, multi-stage funds can pay any price for seed rounds because the check size is immaterial to their fund's success. They view seed investments not on their own return potential, but as an option to secure pro-rata rights in future, massive growth rounds.
While capital is necessary, an overabundance is dangerous. Large secondaries can make founders comfortable and misaligned with investors. Excessive primary capital leads to bloat, unfocused strategy, and removes the pressure that drives invention. This moral hazard often leads to worse outcomes than being capital-constrained.
Y Combinator's model pushes companies to raise at high valuations, often bypassing traditional seed rounds. Simultaneously, mega-funds cherry-pick the most proven founders at prices seed funds cannot compete with. This leaves traditional seed funds fighting for a narrowing and less attractive middle ground.
Despite high returns, large VCs avoid seed investing because it's operationally intense (requiring 10-25x more meetings), access to top founders is a bottleneck, and their large funds require deploying big checks that are incompatible with small seed round sizes.
The venture capital model is incentivized for size, not performance. LPs find it easier to deploy capital into large funds, and a GP of a $5B fund returning 1.01x earns more than a GP of a $500M fund returning 3x. This pressures entrepreneurs to accept massive checks at inflated valuations, distorting the market and potentially harming the company.
Specialized seed-stage VC is an incredibly difficult asset class to sustain. Firms that succeed often 'graduate' to raising larger growth funds, abandoning their seed focus. Those that don't adapt to new founder archetypes and technologies fall by the wayside, leaving few persistent, specialized players.
Multi-stage venture funds often approach seed investing as a way to buy 'option value'. They build a large basket of seed-stage companies with the primary goal of securing the right to double down on the few that break out, rather than forming deep partnerships with each one.
Founders backed by large, multi-stage funds are increasingly bringing in smaller, specialized seed funds. They see these boutique VCs as an "insurance policy"—a more patient, aligned partner who will stick by them if the larger, less-focused fund abandons them for not hitting aggressive growth targets.