A proposed policy for China involves renting access to US-controlled chips (e.g., in Malaysian data centers) instead of selling them outright. This allows Chinese companies to benefit commercially while giving the US the ability to "turn off" the chips if they are misused for military purposes.

Instead of a total ban, a more strategic approach is to "slow ball" an adversary like China by providing them with just enough technology. This keeps them dependent on foreign suppliers and disincentivizes the massive state investment required to develop their own superior, independent solutions.

The decision to allow NVIDIA to sell powerful AI chips to China has a counterintuitive goal. The administration believes that by supplying China, it can "take the air out" of the country's own efforts to build a self-sufficient AI chip ecosystem, thereby hindering domestic firms like Huawei.

Counterintuitively, Thompson argues against cutting China off from Taiwan's semiconductor manufacturing (TSMC). A China dependent on Taiwan is less likely to act aggressively toward it. Creating a situation where the U.S. relies on Taiwan while China does not increases the risk of conflict, as China's optimal move could become disabling that key U.S. asset.

Beyond financial metrics, the most significant 'tail risk' to the AI boom is the high concentration of advanced semiconductor manufacturing overseas, particularly in Taiwan. A geopolitical conflict could sever the supply of essential hardware, posing a much more fundamental threat to the industry's growth than market volatility or corporate overspending.

Taiwan's TSMC dominates advanced chip manufacturing not only through technical excellence but also its business model. By acting as a pure-play foundry that doesn't compete with its clients (unlike Intel or Samsung), it fostered unique trust and partnerships, making it the central hub of the semiconductor ecosystem and a critical geopolitical asset.

Contrary to their intent, U.S. export controls on AI chips have backfired. Instead of crippling China's AI development, the restrictions provided the necessary incentive for China to aggressively invest in and accelerate its own semiconductor industry, potentially eroding the U.S.'s long-term competitive advantage.

A zero-tolerance policy on selling advanced AI chips to China might be strategically shortsighted. Allowing some sales could build a degree of dependence within China's ecosystem. This dependence then becomes a powerful point of leverage that the U.S. could exploit in a future crisis, a weapon it wouldn't have if China were forced into total self-sufficiency from the start.

Dan Sundheim identifies a potential conflict with China over Taiwan's semiconductor dominance as the single biggest tail risk to the global economy. Since Taiwan produces over 90% of advanced chips, a disruption to this fragile supply chain would be catastrophic, potentially triggering an economic crisis on the scale of the Great Depression.