A proposed policy for China involves renting access to US-controlled chips (e.g., in Malaysian data centers) instead of selling them outright. This allows Chinese companies to benefit commercially while giving the US the ability to "turn off" the chips if they are misused for military purposes.

Instead of a total ban, a more strategic approach is to "slow ball" an adversary like China by providing them with just enough technology. This keeps them dependent on foreign suppliers and disincentivizes the massive state investment required to develop their own superior, independent solutions.

The decision to allow NVIDIA to sell powerful AI chips to China has a counterintuitive goal. The administration believes that by supplying China, it can "take the air out" of the country's own efforts to build a self-sufficient AI chip ecosystem, thereby hindering domestic firms like Huawei.

Taiwan's TSMC dominates advanced chip manufacturing not only through technical excellence but also its business model. By acting as a pure-play foundry that doesn't compete with its clients (unlike Intel or Samsung), it fostered unique trust and partnerships, making it the central hub of the semiconductor ecosystem and a critical geopolitical asset.

A zero-tolerance policy on selling advanced AI chips to China might be strategically shortsighted. Allowing some sales could build a degree of dependence within China's ecosystem. This dependence then becomes a powerful point of leverage that the U.S. could exploit in a future crisis, a weapon it wouldn't have if China were forced into total self-sufficiency from the start.

Contrary to advocating for a full embargo, Nvidia CEO Jensen Huang argues that selling advanced chips to China is strategically advantageous for the US. His thesis is that creating technological dependency on American hardware is a more powerful long-term lever than allowing China to become self-sufficient with domestic champions.

The US ban on selling Nvidia's most advanced AI chips to China backfired. It forced China to accelerate its domestic chip industry, with companies like Huawei now producing competitive alternatives, ultimately reducing China's reliance on American technology.

Dan Sundheim identifies a potential conflict with China over Taiwan's semiconductor dominance as the single biggest tail risk to the global economy. Since Taiwan produces over 90% of advanced chips, a disruption to this fragile supply chain would be catastrophic, potentially triggering an economic crisis on the scale of the Great Depression.

A complete ban on selling chips to China is counterproductive. The ideal policy allows NVIDIA to sell chips that are one or two generations behind state-of-the-art. This strategy keeps Chinese firms dependent on the NVIDIA ecosystem, funds U.S. R&D with sales revenue, and hinders domestic competitors like Huawei from flourishing.