The yield premium for private credit has shrunk, meaning investors are no longer adequately compensated for the additional illiquidity, concentration, and credit risk they assume. Publicly traded high-yield bonds and bank loans now offer comparable returns with better diversification and liquidity, questioning the rationale for allocating to private credit.

Companies are willing to pay a 150-200 basis point premium for private credit to gain a strategic partner who provides bespoke financing, governance, and expertise for complex needs like carve-outs. This partnership value proposition distinguishes it from transactional public markets.

Private credit generates a 200 basis point excess spread over public markets by eliminating intermediaries. This 'farm-to-table' model connects investor capital directly to borrowers, providing customized solutions while capturing value that would otherwise be lost to syndication fees.

Private credit allows investors to act like chefs—deeply involved from ingredient sourcing (diligence) to final creation (structuring). Liquid market investors are like food critics, limited to analyzing the finished product with restricted access to information, which increases risk.

While default risk exists, the more pressing problem for credit investors is a severe supply-demand imbalance. A shortage of new M&A and corporate issuance, combined with massive sideline capital (e.g., $8T in money markets), keeps spreads historically tight and makes finding attractive opportunities the main challenge.

A consistent 2-5% of Europe's public high-yield market restructures annually. The conspicuous absence of a parallel event in private markets, which often finance similar companies, suggests that opacity and mark-to-model valuations may be concealing significant, unacknowledged credit risk in private portfolios.

In the post-zero-interest-rate era, the “everything rally” driven by liquidity is over. Higher base rates mean companies must demonstrate fundamental strength, not just ride a market wave. This environment rewards active managers who can perform deep credit selection, as weaker credits no longer outperform by default.

The venture capital paradigm has inverted. Historically, private companies traded at an "illiquidity discount" to their public counterparts. Now, for elite companies, there is an "access premium" where investors pay more for private shares due to scarcity and hype. This makes staying private longer more attractive.

The two credit markets are converging, creating a symbiotic relationship beneficial to both borrowers and investors. Instead of competing, they serve different needs, and savvy investors should combine them opportunistically rather than pitting them against each other.