Xi Jinping's widespread purges, aimed at consolidating power and rooting out corruption, have hollowed out the People's Liberation Army's experienced leadership. This creates a significant capabilities gap and operational readiness problem, potentially jeopardizing the military's ability to meet Xi's own 2027 deadline for being capable of invading Taiwan.
By removing his most experienced commanders, Xi has reduced China's short-term operational readiness for a Taiwan conflict. However, the new generation of promoted generals could be more loyalist "wolf warriors," increasing long-term belligerence.
The unprecedented removal of top generals, including longtime confidants, suggests Xi feels his grip on the military is fragile. This is seen as a sign of weakness and concern over the loyalty and combat readiness of his top commanders.
China's showcase of advanced military hardware, like its new aircraft carrier, is primarily a psychological tool. The strategy is to build a military so 'forbiddingly huge' that the US would hesitate to engage, allowing China to achieve goals like reabsorbing Taiwan without fighting. This suggests their focus is on perceived power to deter intervention.
Chinese leadership believes time is not on its side regarding Taiwan. The growing sense of a distinct Taiwanese identity, especially among younger generations, creates pressure to act before a political 'reunification' becomes impossible, thus increasing the risk of military action.
The investigation of General Zhang Youxia, a childhood friend and trusted ally of Xi Jinping, suggests the military purge extends beyond anti-corruption efforts. It points to a deeper concern with consolidating absolute authority, where even long-standing, powerful allies are seen as potential political threats that must be neutralized.
The purge's focus is on generals who "trampled on the chairman responsibility system," indicating a crackdown on challenges to Xi's direct, supreme command over the military, rather than a standard anti-graft campaign.
The official narrative of China's top general leaking nuclear secrets is likely a cover for a deeper power struggle between President Xi and the military establishment. The ongoing purges are a sign of internal conflict for control, making an invasion of Taiwan less likely due to a destabilized command structure.
An expert from Rhodium Group assesses the probability of a physical military incursion onto Taiwan in the next year as "virtually zero percent." Such an action would represent a complete failure of China's policy of achieving its goals without costly force.
China's strategy for Taiwan likely mirrors its 2019 Hong Kong takeover. Instead of a direct military assault, Beijing will use political influence, espionage, and legislative changes to create administrative bridges, making any physical resistance illegal before troops ever move in.
The widely cited 2027 date for China to be ready to invade Taiwan is an American intelligence assessment, not a public Chinese declaration. It aligns with the PLA's internal modernization deadline for achieving "intelligentised warfare" capabilities, including AI and advanced networks.