Traditional center-left parties are losing influence because they lack a coherent agenda to address the modern drivers of voter discontent. Their continued focus on narrow economic solutions is ineffective against the powerful cultural, identity-based, and technological forces that are actually shaping politics and fueling populism.
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Senator Bernie Sanders argues the Democratic party, once the party of the working class, began courting wealthy donors in the 1970s. This strategic shift led them to neglect core economic issues, causing their traditional base to feel alienated and vote for candidates like Donald Trump.
The rise of populism is better understood as a resurgence of humanity's innate "groupish" and tribal instincts. This regression is amplified by a modern cocktail of social media, rapid migration, and weakening political institutions, making it a deeper cultural and psychological phenomenon than just an economic one.
The global rise of right-wing populism cannot be solely attributed to economic factors like inequality or job loss. Its prevalence in wealthy, low-inequality nations like Sweden and strong manufacturing countries like Germany proves the root cause is a deeper, more widespread cultural anxiety.
The appeal of a populist leader lies in their rejection of traditional political norms. When the electorate feels betrayed by the established "political class," they gravitate toward figures whose rhetoric is a deliberate and stark contrast, signaling they are an outsider.
Politicians use divisive identity politics, focusing on powerless minorities, as a strategic distraction. By demonizing groups like immigrants or trans people, they redirect public frustration away from their failure to address fundamental economic problems like stagnant wages and unaffordable housing.
Left-leaning parties are losing worldwide because they offer economic solutions (e.g., more government programs) to what is fundamentally a cultural problem. Voters feeling existential anxiety from globalization and social change are drawn to the right's message of nostalgia and tradition, not the left's policy proposals.
The traditional left-right political axis is obsolete. A better framework is the 'political horseshoe,' which captures the generational conflict where younger people, facing a future of deglobalization and AI job displacement, are forming new coalitions outside the established consensus upheld by older generations.
Since the 1990s, the left has shifted from material concerns like wages to identity politics expressed in exclusionary academic rhetoric. This has actively repelled the working-class voters it historically championed and needs for a majority coalition.
Political alignment is becoming secondary to economic frustration. Voters are responding to candidates who address rising costs, creating unpredictable alliances and fracturing established bases. This dynamic is swamping traditional ideology, forcing both parties to scramble for a new populist message centered on financial well-being.
The common belief that rising inequality fuels right-wing populism is empirically weak, argues LSE Dean Andres Velasco. Populism has surged in egalitarian countries like Sweden and Germany, and in places like Chile where inequality was falling, suggesting other cultural and political factors are more significant drivers.