The U.S. military is unparalleled in "decisive operations" (Phase 3) but consistently fails at long-term stabilization (Phase 4). To succeed, strategy should be reverse-engineered from the desired post-conflict state, rather than focusing solely on winning the initial battle.

Intended to protect local villages, US outposts often attracted conflict, drawing insurgent fire into civilian areas. This counterproductive dynamic, observed by journalist Wesley Morgan, turned these bases into dangerous liabilities that alienated the very population they were meant to secure, undermining a core tenet of counterinsurgency.

The military fails to effectively transfer knowledge between rotating units in a conflict zone. Incoming units often discard their predecessors' experience, believing they can do better, thus repeating the same errors and failing to build on crucial, hard-won lessons.

The policy of rotating commanders on one-year tours was a critical strategic flaw in Afghanistan. Each new commander arrived believing they had the "recipe for success" and would change the strategy, resulting in a series of disconnected, short-term plans that prevented long-term progress.

Engaging a military with a decentralized command structure is perilous because there's no central authority for negotiation. Even if leadership is neutralized, autonomous cells can continue fighting, creating an unwinnable "headless chicken" scenario where a ceasefire is impossible to implement.

Military analyst Andrew Exum predicted that the war in Ukraine would become 'the best excuse the US army ever found to never say the words Iraq and Afghanistan again.' The institution is rapidly pivoting to large-scale combat operations, dismantling specialized units like the Asymmetric Warfare Group and discarding hard-won counterinsurgency knowledge.

A surprising number of senior non-Army leaders, such as INDOPACOM commander Adm. Samuel Paparo, have counterinsurgency experience from leading Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan. The Navy and Air Force sent their best officers to these ground-based roles, creating a cohort of senior leaders with unique, cross-domain expertise.

To avoid casualties, the U.S. military became increasingly reliant on heavy, road-bound vehicles and heavily fortified bases. This made forces less flexible and unable to access areas that earlier, more nimble units reached with pickup trucks and ATVs. The focus on protection ultimately overextended forces and ceded initiative to the enemy.

Twenty years of focusing on counterinsurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan caused the Army's core competencies for conventional warfare to degrade significantly. For example, short-range air defense (SHORAD) capabilities were so gutted that the Army had to rebuild the entire skill set from scratch, as there were no experienced NCOs left to train new soldiers.