While receiving high cash interest feels good for a lender, it can doom the investment. Forcing a distressed company to allocate all its cash to debt service starves it of the resources needed for a turnaround. This makes PIK (Payment-in-Kind) structures a more sustainable, albeit less immediately gratifying, option.
Private lenders may offer a partial Payment-In-Kind (PIK) toggle as a strategic feature to win a competitive deal for a healthy company. This "PIK on purpose" is distinct from "bad PIK," which occurs when a struggling company cannot service its cash interest payments and is forced to capitalize them.
The classic distressed debt strategy is broken. Market dislocation windows are now incredibly narrow, often lasting just days. Furthermore, low interest rates for the past decade eliminated the ability to earn meaningful carry on discounted debt. This has forced distressed funds to rebrand as 'capital solutions' and focus on private, structured deals.
Oaktree's co-CEO highlights a critical flaw in applying venture logic to debt. In a diversified equity portfolio, one huge winner can offset many failures. In a diversified debt portfolio, the winner only pays its coupon, which is grossly insufficient to cover the principal losses from the losers.
The increase in Payment-In-Kind (PIK) debt to 15-25% of BDC portfolios is not a sign of innovative structuring. Instead, it often results from "amend and extend" processes where weakened companies can no longer afford cash interest payments. This "zombification" signals underlying credit deterioration.
In a distressed scenario, simply asserting seniority as a junior capital provider is ineffective. You cannot force the majority owner and management team, whom you've just told are worthless, to run the business for your benefit. The only viable path is to renegotiate and realign incentives for all parties to work towards a recovery together.
Unlike syndicated loans where non-payment is a clear default, private credit has a "third state" where lenders accept PIK interest on underperforming loans. When this "bad PIK" is correctly categorized as a default, the sector's true default rate is significantly higher, around 5% versus 3% for syndicated loans.
Official non-accrual rates understate private credit distress. A truer default rate emerges when including covenant defaults and 'bad' Payment-in-Kind interest (PIK) from forced renegotiations. These hidden metrics suggest distress levels are comparable to, if not higher than, public markets.
When considering debt, the most critical due diligence is not on deal terms but on the lender's character. Investigate how they have treated portfolio companies during challenging times. Partnering with a lender who will "blow you up" at the first sign of trouble is a catastrophic risk.
For underperforming companies, a gap often exists between the market-clearing leverage for senior debt (e.g., 5x EBITDA) and their current debt load. Specialized investors provide junior capital to fill this "two-turn problem" or "air bubble," facilitating a refinancing that senior lenders alone won't support.
Jeff Aronson reframes "distressed-for-control" as a private equity strategy, not a credit one. While a traditional LBO uses leverage to acquire a company, a distressed-for-control transaction achieves the same end—ownership—by deleveraging the company through a debt-to-equity conversion. The mechanism differs, but the outcome is identical.