The term "middle market" is too broad for risk assessment. KKR's analysis indicates that default risk and performance dispersion are not uniform. Instead, they will be most pronounced in the lower, smaller end of the middle market, while the larger companies in the upper-middle market remain more resilient.

Counter-intuitively, Fed rate cuts harm Business Development Companies (BDCs). Because their loans are floating-rate, cuts directly reduce portfolio yield. This shrinks the buffer available to absorb credit losses and threatens their ability to cover dividend payments, creating a dual pressure on performance.

Out-of-court restructurings, or LMEs, introduce uncertainty into a company's capital structure. This forces the market to apply an additional 10-20 point discount to the trading price of the company's loans, creating a significant alpha-generating opportunity for specialized investors who can accurately underwrite the LME process.

Default rates are not uniform. High-yield bonds are low due to a 2020 "cleansing." Leveraged loans show elevated defaults due to higher rates. Private credit defaults are masked but may be as high as 6%, indicated by "bad PIK" amendments, suggesting hidden stress.

The classic distressed debt strategy is broken. Market dislocation windows are now incredibly narrow, often lasting just days. Furthermore, low interest rates for the past decade eliminated the ability to earn meaningful carry on discounted debt. This has forced distressed funds to rebrand as 'capital solutions' and focus on private, structured deals.

Oaktree's co-CEO highlights a critical flaw in applying venture logic to debt. In a diversified equity portfolio, one huge winner can offset many failures. In a diversified debt portfolio, the winner only pays its coupon, which is grossly insufficient to cover the principal losses from the losers.

A consistent 2-5% of Europe's public high-yield market restructures annually. The conspicuous absence of a parallel event in private markets, which often finance similar companies, suggests that opacity and mark-to-model valuations may be concealing significant, unacknowledged credit risk in private portfolios.

The dramatic rise in BNPL usage across all demographics, including 41% of young shoppers, is a negative forward-looking indicator. While framed as innovation, it's a form of modern usury that reveals consumers cannot afford their purchases, creating a significant, under-discussed credit risk for the economy.

Jeff Aronson reframes "distressed-for-control" as a private equity strategy, not a credit one. While a traditional LBO uses leverage to acquire a company, a distressed-for-control transaction achieves the same end—ownership—by deleveraging the company through a debt-to-equity conversion. The mechanism differs, but the outcome is identical.