Private lenders may offer a partial Payment-In-Kind (PIK) toggle as a strategic feature to win a competitive deal for a healthy company. This "PIK on purpose" is distinct from "bad PIK," which occurs when a struggling company cannot service its cash interest payments and is forced to capitalize them.
Borrowers choose premium-priced private credit not just for speed and certainty, but for tangible value-added services. Blackstone offers portfolio-wide cross-selling, operational cost reduction support, and cybersecurity assessments, creating over $5 billion in enterprise value for its credit portfolio companies.
Companies are willing to pay a 150-200 basis point premium for private credit to gain a strategic partner who provides bespoke financing, governance, and expertise for complex needs like carve-outs. This partnership value proposition distinguishes it from transactional public markets.
The increase in Payment-In-Kind (PIK) debt to 15-25% of BDC portfolios is not a sign of innovative structuring. Instead, it often results from "amend and extend" processes where weakened companies can no longer afford cash interest payments. This "zombification" signals underlying credit deterioration.
Corporations are increasingly shifting from asset-heavy to capital-light models, often through complex transactions like sale-leasebacks. This strategic trend creates bespoke financing needs that are better served by the flexible solutions of private credit providers than by rigid public markets.
Structuring deals with contractually committed reserve capital from LPs provides a safety net for downturns and ready capital for unforeseen growth opportunities. This gives confidence to lenders, management, and sellers, and ensures the sponsor's pro-rata participation aligns all parties.
Official non-accrual rates understate private credit distress. A truer default rate emerges when including covenant defaults and 'bad' Payment-in-Kind interest (PIK) from forced renegotiations. These hidden metrics suggest distress levels are comparable to, if not higher than, public markets.
When considering debt, the most critical due diligence is not on deal terms but on the lender's character. Investigate how they have treated portfolio companies during challenging times. Partnering with a lender who will "blow you up" at the first sign of trouble is a catastrophic risk.
Financing discussions should carry the same strategic weight as M&A talks. Philip Ross argues the cost of capital from selling stock is often theoretically higher than from selling the entire company. This reframes the decision to dilute ownership for funding as a pivotal choice that boards and management teams should not take lightly.
While leverage multiples are similar across the market, Neuberger targets companies acquired at high purchase price multiples (avg. 17x). This strategy results in a significantly lower loan-to-value ratio, providing a larger equity cushion and reducing the lender's ultimate risk.
Unlike syndicated loans where repricing can be threatened easily by banks, direct loans have structural protections. Borrowers must find an entirely new lender and pay new fees to refinance, making it much harder to reprice debt downwards and thus preserving higher returns for investors.