The failure to militarily secure the Strait of Hormuz is a major strategic concession. It demonstrates a critical vulnerability and effectively hands Iran control over a global economic chokepoint, allowing them to wield immense leverage over international trade.

The administration's actions, like blockading the Strait of Hormuz to open it, are not based on conventional rationale. Murphy asserts they are the result of inexperienced officials who fundamentally misunderstand diplomacy, leading to a nonsensical approach driven by incompetence rather than a coherent, albeit flawed, strategy.

The seemingly "Trumpiest" option of unilaterally declaring victory and withdrawing is highly risky. Iran could simply continue its hostile actions, such as keeping the Strait of Hormuz closed. This would immediately expose the "victory" as a sham, turning a political win into a major international humiliation for the president.

Despite the administration's mixed and often aggressive messaging, financial markets are betting on a swift end to the conflict. The significant drop in oil prices reflects a collective, unemotional assessment that the Straits of Hormuz will reopen soon, providing a powerful counter-signal to political statements.

The US has long used the threat of military force to keep the Strait of Hormuz open. By failing to act despite a large naval presence, it has revealed this deterrent is hollow. This hands Iran a proven economic weapon and erodes the credibility of US power projection globally.

Iran successfully leveraged its control over the Strait of Hormuz, a critical global trade chokepoint, to create immense economic pressure. This conventional deterrent shifted the burden onto the US to de-escalate, proving more immediately impactful than a theoretical nuclear capability.

Rahm Emanuel outlines a strategy to manage the Strait of Hormuz crisis: a clear short-term shipping policy, medium-term administration by a UN group to manage fees, and a long-term plan to build pipelines that bypass the strait, strengthening the Abraham Accords.

A potential off-ramp for the conflict is not military victory but a bureaucratic financial solution. By massively increasing the US Development Finance Corporation’s political risk insurance limit, the US could underwrite maritime shipping, incentivizing transit despite the military risk.

Military strikes against Iranian assets are insufficient for the US to claim victory. The conflict's true endgame hinges on controlling maritime traffic in the Strait of Hormuz, as this economic chokepoint represents Iran's ultimate leverage and prevents a US declaration of success.