Despite its talent, Europe struggles to scale domestic tech companies, leaving it strategically vulnerable. It's forced to depend on US cloud providers it views with suspicion or Chinese alternatives it also distrusts, with no viable third option.
Despite stated goals to build a strong domestic AI industry, governments like the UK procure the vast majority of their AI services from foreign companies. This sends a negative signal about local technology and fails to create an internal market, starving homegrown AI companies of crucial revenue.
Direct AI disruption is a minimal concern for telecom companies. The more significant threat comes from hyperscalers like AWS and Azure, which already dominate Europe's B2B cloud market with an 85% share. The real risk is these giants leveraging their cloud infrastructure to enter the B2C telecom space via virtualized networks.
The Dutch government took control of Chinese-owned Nexperia, a major European chipmaker, citing national security risks. This move is far more aggressive than U.S. strategies like taking minority stakes, indicating a European willingness to nationalize key tech assets to counter foreign influence in the semiconductor supply chain.
The US assumes its democratic values create a trust advantage. However, unpredictable actions, like threatening to cut off tech access to partners, undermine this trust and create an opening for China. China is exploiting this by positioning itself as a more reliable, if not more ideologically aligned, long-term supplier, especially in the Global South.
Beyond the US-China rivalry, a new front is opening between Brussels and Beijing. Incidents like the French suspension of fashion retailer Shein are not isolated but symptomatic of growing European mistrust and a willingness to take action. This signals a potential fracturing of global trade blocs and increased regulatory risk for Chinese firms in the EU.
The push for sovereign AI clouds extends beyond data privacy. The core geopolitical driver is a fear of becoming a "net importer of intelligence." Nations view domestic AI production as critical infrastructure, akin to energy or water, to avoid dependency on the US or China, similar to how the Middle East controls oil.
For Europe to compete in AI, it must overcome its aversion to large-scale energy projects. The winning strategy is to co-locate massive compute infrastructure in areas with cheap, abundant energy, like Norwegian wind farms. Without this, Europe risks becoming a 'tourist economy' built on past glories.
The EU's AI Act has been so restrictive that it has largely killed native AI development in Europe. The regulation is so punitive that even major American companies like Apple and Meta are choosing not to launch their leading-edge AI capabilities there, demonstrating the chilling effect of preemptive, overbearing regulation.
Europe has vibrant startup scenes, but its core challenge is the "scale-up" phase. Promising companies often relocate to the U.S. to access deeper venture capital markets and a larger, more unified customer base for international expansion.
The conflict between Dutch chipmaker Nexperia and its Chinese parent, triggered by US sanctions, shows how European companies are becoming unintended casualties in the broader US-China geopolitical struggle, extending the tech war's impact beyond the two primary nations.