Typically, credit card balances trade at a premium. JP Morgan's ability to acquire Apple Card's $20 billion portfolio from Goldman Sachs at a discount suggests they negotiated protection against potential losses from higher-than-expected defaults and subprime borrowers, revealing underlying risks in the high-profile portfolio.
The prevalence of specific, quantifiable deal terms offers a unique window into the market's mood. Rising structural protections for lenders or increased flexibility for borrowers act as an early warning system, reflecting anxieties and optimism before they appear in traditional economic data.
Unlike typical co-branded credit card portfolios that sell for a premium, Goldman Sachs offloaded the Apple Card's debt to JPMorgan at a significant loss. This underscores the program's unprofitability, driven by high defaults and operational costs, despite the prestigious Apple brand.
The credit market appears healthy based on tight average spreads, but this is misleading. A strong top 90% of the market pulls the average down, while the bottom 10% faces severe distress, with loans "dropping like a stone." The weight of prolonged high borrowing costs is creating a clear divide between healthy and struggling companies.
Private equity giants like Blackstone, Apollo, and KKR are marking the same distressed private loan at widely different values (82, 70, and 91 cents on the dollar). This lack of a unified mark-to-market standard obscures true risk levels, echoing the opaque conditions that preceded the 2008 subprime crisis.
Steve Jobs fostered an inclusive premium brand accessible to anyone with money. Applying this to the Apple Card meant low credit score requirements, which conflicted with the financial necessity of risk-based rejection in lending. This philosophical mismatch contributed significantly to Goldman Sachs's portfolio losses and the partnership's failure.
While many assume high credit card rates cover default risk, actual charge-offs on revolving balances average only 5.75%. This is a significant cost but accounts for less than a third of the typical interest rate spread, indicating that other factors like risk premiums and operating costs are major drivers.
Steve Jobs' vision of Apple as an inclusive brand conflicted with the necessary exclusivity of credit risk assessment. This led to lower underwriting standards (credit scores around 600) for the Apple Card, contributing to its poor performance and eventual sale by Goldman Sachs at a discount.
Tech giants are issuing massive amounts of highly-rated debt at a discount to fund AI expansion. This makes existing, lower-rated corporate bonds from other sectors look less attractive by comparison, forcing a repricing of risk and higher borrowing costs across the credit spectrum.
Apple's demand for unique features like non-staggered billing dates and high-touch service created unsustainable operational costs for Goldman Sachs. This shows how a brand's core philosophy can be a liability in a commoditized industry that relies on standardization for profit.
Goldman Sachs, built for high-touch, low-volume institutional clients, was operationally mismatched for Apple's mass-market demands like high-volume customer service and synchronized billing. This reveals the danger of assuming a partner's brand prestige translates to the operational capabilities required for a completely different customer segment.