While many assume high credit card rates cover default risk, actual charge-offs on revolving balances average only 5.75%. This is a significant cost but accounts for less than a third of the typical interest rate spread, indicating that other factors like risk premiums and operating costs are major drivers.
Contrary to the common perception of users paying off balances monthly ("transactors"), the majority—about 60%—are "revolvers" who carry debt. This group is the primary source of profit for card issuers, as they are subject to interest rates now averaging a staggering 23%.
Default rates are not uniform. High-yield bonds are low due to a 2020 "cleansing." Leveraged loans show elevated defaults due to higher rates. Private credit defaults are masked but may be as high as 6%, indicated by "bad PIK" amendments, suggesting hidden stress.
The same banks issuing high-interest credit cards offer substantially cheaper personal lines of credit to customers with identical FICO scores. Despite being a logical tool for consolidating expensive card debt, these products receive almost no marketing, making them largely invisible to consumers.
The credit market appears healthy based on tight average spreads, but this is misleading. A strong top 90% of the market pulls the average down, while the bottom 10% faces severe distress, with loans "dropping like a stone." The weight of prolonged high borrowing costs is creating a clear divide between healthy and struggling companies.
In large loan portfolios, defaults are not evenly distributed. As seen in a student loan example, the vast majority (90%) of defaults can originate from a specific sub-segment, like for-profit schools, and occur within a predictable timeframe, such as the first 18 months.
A surprisingly large portion of high credit card APRs covers operating expenses, particularly marketing. Issuers like Amex and Capital One spend billions annually on customer acquisition. This spending is passed directly to consumers, as higher marketing budgets correlate with higher chargeable rates.
Official non-accrual rates understate private credit distress. A truer default rate emerges when including covenant defaults and 'bad' Payment-in-Kind interest (PIK) from forced renegotiations. These hidden metrics suggest distress levels are comparable to, if not higher than, public markets.
Consumers are largely insensitive to the interest rates they are charged, rarely seeking out cheaper options like credit union cards. This behavioral pattern means that cutting rates is an ineffective customer acquisition strategy. Instead, issuers invest heavily in marketing, which proves more effective at attracting new borrowers.
Affirm's CEO argues the core flaw of credit cards is not high APRs, but a business model that profits from consumer mistakes. Lenders are incentivized by compounding interest and late fees, meaning they benefit when customers take longer to pay and stumble.
While typical banks earn a 1-1.2% return on assets (ROA), credit card-focused banks achieve ROAs of 3.5-4%. This exceptional profitability, driven by high interest rates, explains why the sector is so attractive to new entrants, as it is one of the most profitable areas in all of finance.