Unable to afford physical components, Steve Wozniak spent years designing computers on paper. This constraint forced him to compete with himself to use the fewest possible parts, a skill that became a critical competitive advantage for Apple's early, cost-effective hardware.

Wozniak's insistence on eight expansion slots for the Apple II, against Jobs's preference for two, created a third-party ecosystem that drove sales. This open architecture's success funded the company, enabling the development of Jobs's later closed-system products.

Founders often get stuck endlessly perfecting a product, believing it must be flawless before launch. This is a fallacy, as "perfection" is subjective. The correct approach is to launch early and iterate based on real market feedback, as there is no perfect time to start.

Technically-minded founders often believe superior technology is the ultimate measure of success. The critical metamorphosis is realizing the market only rewards a great business model, measured by revenue and margins, not technical elegance. Appreciating go-to-market is essential.

Driven by a philosophy that engineering is the highest calling, Steve Wozniak never wanted to manage people or run a company. His primary motivation was to stay a hands-on engineer at the bottom of the org chart, a counter-cultural mindset that shaped his design choices and his relationship with Apple.

Wozniak firmly believed that revolutionary products are not invented by committees. He advised inventors to work alone, comparing the process to art. This solitary approach, free from corporate bureaucracy and marketing-driven compromises, allows for the creation of truly novel designs without dilution.

Apple never intended to build a business machine. The Apple II became one because VisiCalc, the first "killer app," required a feature set (RAM, floppy drive, display) that only Wozniak's computer happened to have. This accident transformed Apple's market overnight, proving platform success can be driven by unforeseen uses.

Sony neutralized Sega's technologically superior Dreamcast by pre-emptively marketing the upcoming PlayStation 2. They used evocative but abstract concepts like the "Emotion Engine" to convince consumers to wait, demonstrating how a powerful marketing narrative can defeat a superior product already on the market.

A powerful test for a decisive strategy, borrowed from Roger Martin, is to consider its opposite. If the opposite is obviously foolish (e.g., "we will win with a terrible user interface"), your strategy isn't making a real, difficult choice and therefore lacks focus and strategic value.