Historically, private equity was pursued for its potential outperformance (alpha). Today, with shrinking public markets, its main value is providing diversification and access to a growing universe of private companies that are no longer available on public exchanges. This makes it a core portfolio completion tool.

Widespread adoption of alternatives in "off-the-shelf" target-date funds faces immense inertia. The initial traction will come from large corporations with sophisticated internal investment teams creating custom target-date funds and from individual managed account platforms, which are far more nimble.

The primary decision-makers for mass-market 401(k) plans are often HR or finance teams, not investors. To shield their companies from employee lawsuits, they have historically prioritized funds with the lowest fees, creating a massive structural barrier for higher-fee alternative investments to gain traction.

While fears of retail investors gambling on venture capital exist, the primary growth in retail alternatives is in yield-oriented strategies like private credit and infrastructure. These products meet the demand for high current income and lower volatility, especially for those in or near retirement, making them a more logical first step.

For the sophisticated custom target-date funds that will be early adopters, private credit is the easiest first step. Unlike private equity, some private credit products can already be marked daily. This operational readiness, combined with liquidity from distributions, makes it the path of least resistance.

Alternative asset managers cannot simply create a product and expect private wealth channels to 'fill the bucket.' Success requires a significant, dedicated infrastructure for wholesaling, marketing, and advisor education across various dealer channels—a resource-intensive commitment that serves as a high barrier to entry.

The US retirement system is built on a chassis of daily liquidity and pricing. While some hope the system might adapt to the monthly or quarterly nature of alternatives, the more likely outcome is that private market managers will be forced to develop reliable daily NAV calculations to gain access.

Instead of viewing the flood of private wealth as competition for deals, savvy institutional investors can capitalize on it. Opportunities exist to seed new retail-focused vehicles to gain economics, buy GP stakes in managers entering the wealth channel, or use new evergreen funds as a source of secondary market liquidity.

Adding higher-fee private assets to existing low-cost target-date funds is a non-starter. The go-to-market strategy will be to create entirely new fund series. This presents a significant sales challenge, as employers must be convinced to actively move employee assets to the new, more complex products.