For the sophisticated custom target-date funds that will be early adopters, private credit is the easiest first step. Unlike private equity, some private credit products can already be marked daily. This operational readiness, combined with liquidity from distributions, makes it the path of least resistance.

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Ultra-late-stage companies like Ramp and Stripe represent a new category: "private as public." They could be public but choose not to be. Investors should expect returns similar to mid-cap public stocks (e.g., 30-40% YoY), not the 2-3x multiples of traditional venture rounds. The asset class is different, so the return profile must be too.

Private equity and venture capital funds create an illusion of stability by avoiding daily mark-to-market pricing. This "laundering of volatility" is a core reason companies stay private longer. It reveals a key, if artificial, benefit of private markets that new technologies like tokenization could disrupt.

Widespread adoption of alternatives in "off-the-shelf" target-date funds faces immense inertia. The initial traction will come from large corporations with sophisticated internal investment teams creating custom target-date funds and from individual managed account platforms, which are far more nimble.

The primary decision-makers for mass-market 401(k) plans are often HR or finance teams, not investors. To shield their companies from employee lawsuits, they have historically prioritized funds with the lowest fees, creating a massive structural barrier for higher-fee alternative investments to gain traction.

Alternative asset managers cannot simply create a product and expect private wealth channels to 'fill the bucket.' Success requires a significant, dedicated infrastructure for wholesaling, marketing, and advisor education across various dealer channels—a resource-intensive commitment that serves as a high barrier to entry.

The US retirement system is built on a chassis of daily liquidity and pricing. While some hope the system might adapt to the monthly or quarterly nature of alternatives, the more likely outcome is that private market managers will be forced to develop reliable daily NAV calculations to gain access.

The venture capital paradigm has inverted. Historically, private companies traded at an "illiquidity discount" to their public counterparts. Now, for elite companies, there is an "access premium" where investors pay more for private shares due to scarcity and hype. This makes staying private longer more attractive.

Instead of viewing the flood of private wealth as competition for deals, savvy institutional investors can capitalize on it. Opportunities exist to seed new retail-focused vehicles to gain economics, buy GP stakes in managers entering the wealth channel, or use new evergreen funds as a source of secondary market liquidity.

Adding higher-fee private assets to existing low-cost target-date funds is a non-starter. The go-to-market strategy will be to create entirely new fund series. This presents a significant sales challenge, as employers must be convinced to actively move employee assets to the new, more complex products.

A credit investor's true edge lies not in understanding a company's operations, but in mastering the right-hand side of the balance sheet. This includes legal structures, credit agreements, and bankruptcy processes. Private equity investors, who are owners, will always have superior knowledge of the business itself (the left-hand side).