Unable to compete globally on inference-as-a-service due to US chip sanctions, China has pivoted to releasing top-tier open-source models. This serves as a powerful soft power play, appealing to other nations and building a technological sphere of influence independent of the US.
China's promotion of open-weight models is a strategic maneuver to exert global influence. By controlling the underlying models that answer questions about history, borders, and values, a nation can shape global narratives and project soft power, much like Hollywood did for the U.S.
Facing semiconductor shortages, China is pursuing a unique AI development path. Instead of competing directly on compute power, its strategy leverages national strengths in vast data sets, a large talent pool, and significant power infrastructure to drive AI progress and a medium-term localization strategy.
While US firms lead in cutting-edge AI, the impressive quality of open-source models from China is compressing the market. As these free models improve, more tasks become "good enough" for open source, creating significant pricing pressure on premium, closed-source foundation models from companies like OpenAI and Google.
China is pursuing a low-cost, open-source AI model, similar to Android's market strategy. This contrasts with the US's expensive, high-performance "iPhone" approach. This accessibility and cost-effectiveness could allow Chinese AI to dominate the global market, especially in developing nations.
A nation's advantage is its "intelligent capital stock": its total GPU compute power multiplied by the quality of its AI models. This explains the US restricting GPU sales to China, which counters by excelling in open-source models to close the gap.
Z.AI and other Chinese labs recognize Western enterprises won't use their APIs due to trust and data concerns. By open-sourcing models, they bypass this barrier to gain developer adoption, global mindshare, and brand credibility, viewing it as a pragmatic go-to-market tactic rather than an ideological stance.
Contrary to their intent, U.S. export controls on AI chips have backfired. Instead of crippling China's AI development, the restrictions provided the necessary incentive for China to aggressively invest in and accelerate its own semiconductor industry, potentially eroding the U.S.'s long-term competitive advantage.
China is compensating for its deficit in cutting-edge semiconductors by pursuing an asymmetric strategy. It focuses on massive 'superclusters' of less advanced domestic chips and creating hyper-efficient, open-source AI models. This approach prioritizes widespread, low-cost adoption over chasing the absolute peak of performance like the US.
While the U.S. leads in closed, proprietary AI models like OpenAI's, Chinese companies now dominate the leaderboards for open-source models. Because they are cheaper and easier to deploy, these Chinese models are seeing rapid global uptake, challenging the U.S.'s perceived lead in AI through wider diffusion and application.
The business model for powerful, free, open-source AI models from Chinese companies may not be direct profit. Instead, it could be a strategy to globally distribute an AI trained on a specific worldview, competing with American models on an ideological rather than purely commercial level.