A large, multi-stage VC firm's growth fund serves as a risk mitigation tool. The ability to concentrate capital into late-stage winners covers losses from a higher volume of early-stage mistakes, allowing the firm to be more "promiscuous" and take more shots at Series A.
Mega-funds can justify paying "stupid prices" at the seed stage because they aren't underwriting a seed-stage return. Instead, they are buying an option on the next, much larger round where they'll deploy real capital. This allows them to outbid smaller funds who need to generate returns from the initial investment itself.
The fundamental risk profile shifts dramatically between venture stages. Early-stage investors bet against business failure, an idiosyncratic risk unique to each company. Late-stage investors are primarily betting on public market multiples and macro sentiment holding up—a systematic risk affecting all late-stage assets simultaneously.
A core part of a16z's growth fund strategy is to invest in companies the firm's early-stage team passed on. This acts as an internal "fix the mistake fund," providing a structured way to correct errors of omission and get a second chance at breakout companies.
Large, multi-stage funds can pay any price for seed rounds because the check size is immaterial to their fund's success. They view seed investments not on their own return potential, but as an option to secure pro-rata rights in future, massive growth rounds.
A successful seed fund model is to first build a diversified 'farm team' of 20-25 companies with meaningful initial ownership. Then, after identifying the breakout performers, concentrate heavily by deploying up to 75% of the fund's capital into just 3-5 of them.
AI companies raise subsequent rounds so quickly that little is de-risked between seed and Series B, yet valuations skyrocket. This dynamic forces large funds, which traditionally wait for traction, to compete at the earliest inception stage to secure a stake before prices become untenable for the risk involved.
A primary function of Andreessen Horowitz's growth fund is to correct errors of omission from its early-stage team. Joking referred to as the "fix the mistake fund," it provides a second chance to invest in companies the firm initially passed on. This internal synergy is a core part of their multi-stage strategy.
The increased volatility and shorter defensibility windows in the AI era challenge traditional VC portfolio construction. The logical response to this heightened risk is greater diversification. This implies that early-stage funds may need to be larger to support more investments or write smaller checks into more companies.
True alpha in venture capital is found at the extremes. It's either in being a "market maker" at the earliest stages by shaping a raw idea, or by writing massive, late-stage checks where few can compete. The competitive, crowded middle-stages offer less opportunity for outsized returns.
Separating investment teams by stage (seed, growth, public) creates misaligned incentives and arbitrary knowledge silos. A unified, multi-stage team can focus only on the handful of companies that truly matter, follow them across their entire lifecycle, and "never miss" an opportunity, even if the entry point changes.