The term "middle market" is too broad for risk assessment. KKR's analysis indicates that default risk and performance dispersion are not uniform. Instead, they will be most pronounced in the lower, smaller end of the middle market, while the larger companies in the upper-middle market remain more resilient.

Default rates are not uniform. High-yield bonds are low due to a 2020 "cleansing." Leveraged loans show elevated defaults due to higher rates. Private credit defaults are masked but may be as high as 6%, indicated by "bad PIK" amendments, suggesting hidden stress.

The US corporate market is 75% financed by capital markets, while Europe's is ~80% bank-financed. This structural inversion means Europe is undergoing a long-term, multi-decade shift toward institutional lending, creating a sustained tailwind for private credit growth that is far from mature.

Recent "canary in the coal mine" cases like First Brands, often blamed on private markets, were not PE-owned and were primarily financed in liquid markets. In fact, it was private credit firms pushing for deeper diligence that exposed the issues, strengthening the argument that private credit offers a safer way to access the asset class.

Corporations are increasingly shifting from asset-heavy to capital-light models, often through complex transactions like sale-leasebacks. This strategic trend creates bespoke financing needs that are better served by the flexible solutions of private credit providers than by rigid public markets.

A consistent 2-5% of Europe's public high-yield market restructures annually. The conspicuous absence of a parallel event in private markets, which often finance similar companies, suggests that opacity and mark-to-model valuations may be concealing significant, unacknowledged credit risk in private portfolios.

A staggering 70% of private credit managers have less than a decade of experience, meaning their entire careers have been in a low-rate, bull market environment. This lack of cycle-tested experience poses a significant systemic risk as market conditions normalize and stress appears.

Unlike US firms focused on rapid exits, many multi-generational European family businesses prioritize stability and privacy. They actively dislike the anonymity and disclosure requirements of public markets, creating a strong, relationship-driven demand for tailored private lending solutions.

The two credit markets are converging, creating a symbiotic relationship beneficial to both borrowers and investors. Instead of competing, they serve different needs, and savvy investors should combine them opportunistically rather than pitting them against each other.